Real Rape Too

Bennett Capers*

As a society, we have been largely indifferent to the prevalence of male rape victimization. In the prison context, we dismiss it as par for the course, as “just deserts,” or worse yet, as a rarely stated but widely known component of deterrence. We treat prisons as invisible zones, as zones without law, as zones that need not concern us. Outside the prison context, our response is no better. We tell ourselves male rape victimization is a rarity, or perhaps something that only happens to gay men. In short, we render male victim rape invisible, or at least un-articulable. This Article renders male victim rape visible.

This Article is also a critique of unjust silence and unjust talk. It is a critique of the unjust silence surrounding male rape victimization that permeates legal scholarship about rape. And it is a critique of the unjust talk about the specter of male rape that permeates self-defense and provocation cases. The Article argues that reconceptualizing rape as a gender-neutral crime might help advocates of rape law reform forge new alliances. It posits that addressing the reality of male victim rape can help us rethink the very real harm of rape. And it demonstrates that incorporating the reality of male victimization can have profound implications for rethinking the law of rape.

What motivates this Article is the underlying belief that rape has been gendered for too long. Originally, it was gendered in a way that tilted the scales to benefit men: men as fathers, men as husbands, and men as rapists. Feminists were right to point out the sexism inherent

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in traditional rape laws in this country. Though many, including Catherine MacKinnon, were wrong to view rape as solely a mechanism of male domination of women. But the real problem is this: In arguing for reform, feminist scholars have legitimized and contributed to the very gender distinctions of which they have been so critical. In response to one form of subordination, they have entrenched another. Many rape statutes have been reformed so that they are gender neutral, but how we apply those laws is still very much gendered. As a consequence, male victims have suffered. But more broadly, the law of rape has suffered. And it shows.

INTRODUCTION

To really understand Johnson v. Johnson, it helps to start at the beginning. According to Roderick Johnson, a former Navy sailor, it was his falling in with the wrong crowd and subsequent drug problem that led him to burglarize a neighbor and, consequently, to an eighteen-month prison sentence. The length of the sentence, however, was nothing compared to the terms imposed on him by other inmates and the indifference of the prison officials towards those terms. Almost immediately upon his arrival at prison, a gang called the Gangster Disciples claimed ownership of Johnson and beat and raped him daily. The Gangster Disciples also rented Johnson out as a sex slave to other inmates, charging five or ten dollars depending on the sex act, payable in cash, commissary privileges, or cigarettes.

The prison staff ignored Johnson’s appeals for protection, even as medical personnel documented bruises on Johnson’s body. It was the staff’s failure to

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1. 385 F.3d 503 (5th Cir. 2004).
3. Id.
4. Id.
At trial, witnesses included a former high-ranking member of the Gangster Disciples. Asked whether Johnson was considered a member of the gang, the witness answered “no.” When asked whether Johnson ever consented to forced sex, the witness smirked. “You’ll be beaten until you say yes. He’d be beaten, stabbed, whatever.”

In a way, Johnson v. Johnson is unique—most male rape victims lack the resources to file suit. What is not unique is Johnson’s experience of prison rape. In a 2007 study, the Bureau of Justice Statistics found that 4.5 percent of the inmates surveyed reported being sexually abused in the previous twelve months. Extrapolating nationally, the study estimated that more than 60,000 inmates are sexually abused each year. In all likelihood these numbers are conservative. Because of the stigma of appearing weak and the fear of retaliation, male victims of prison rape often choose not to report their victimization to prison authorities or counselors. In addition, the findings fail to reflect the impact of repeated assaults. Prisoners who are raped rarely have access to safe spaces. Instead, they are subjected to repeated, if not daily, sexual assaults.

As a society, we rarely think of male-victim rape. On the few occasions that we do, we assume male rape victimization occurs only in prisons. That assumption is wrong. In fact, even outside of prisons, males are victims of rape. A study conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, based on surveys of households, estimated that more than 36,000 males age twelve and over were victims of completed rape or attempted rape during 2008 alone and that one in

5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
10. Id.
12. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO ESCAPE: MALE RAPE IN U.S. PRISONS 7 (2001) [hereinafter NO ESCAPE]. This is to say nothing of the assaults that take the form of gang rapes, which cause a qualitatively different type of harm. For one, gang rape involves public humiliation. As one commentator has observed, “gang rape is a crime that involves, and indeed requires, an audience.” Kimberly K. Allen, Note, Guilty by (More Than) Association: The Case for Spectator Liability in Gang Rape, 99 GEO. L.J. 837, 848 (2011).
13. I use the terms “male-victim rape” or “male rape victimization” to describe male-on-male rape. This is not to suggest that female-perpetrator/male-victim rape does not exist. In fact, many child sexual abuse victims identify their abusers as female. Moreover, as the recent prosecution of female officer Lynndie England in connection with abuse at Abu Ghraib should make clear, women are not above sexually abusing adult men. For a discussion of female-perpetrator/male-victim rape, see the chapter “Female Perpetrators; Male Victims” in Joanna Bourke’s Rape. JOANNA BOURKE, RAPE: SEX, VIOLENCE, HISTORY 204–37 (2007).
thirty-three men in the United States has been the victim of rape or attempted rape.\textsuperscript{14} Again, this number probably underestimates the frequency of male-victim rape. Even more than female victims, male rape victims are likely to encounter disbelief or derision when they report their victimization.\textsuperscript{15} In addition, male victims, both straight and gay, face the added risk of homophobia.\textsuperscript{16} Indeed, prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in \textit{Lawrence v. Texas}\textsuperscript{17} invalidating sodomy laws, those who came forward as rape victims risked being prosecuted as criminals in many states.\textsuperscript{18}

This Article is about male rape victimization and our collective response to such victimization. It is about addressing the prevalence of male-on-male rape without reducing it to entertainment\textsuperscript{19} or a joke\textsuperscript{20} and without dismissing it as something too rare to concern us. As a society we have been largely indifferent to the prevalence of male rape victimization. In the prison context, we dismiss it as par for the course, as “just deserts,” or, worse yet, as a rarely stated but widely known component of deterrence.\textsuperscript{21} We show the same level of

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\item[17.] Lawrence overruled the Court’s prior decision in \textit{Bowers v. Hardwick}, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), in which it upheld the constitutionality of laws criminalizing consensual same-sex intimacy.
\item[18.] See infra notes 106–108 and accompanying text. For example, a male rape victim who, during police questioning, admitted that he had engaged in acts of consensual sex with males on prior occasions could be prosecuted for committing sodomy based on those prior acts.
\item[19.] For example, the HBO series \textit{Oz} routinely presented prison rape as a form of entertainment. See Joe Wlodarz, \textit{Maximum Insecurity: Genre Trouble and Closet Erotics in and out of HBO’s Oz}, 20 \textit{Camera Obscura: Feminism, Culture, and Media} 59 (2005).
\item[20.] \textit{No Escape}, supra note 12, at 3. Examples where prison rape is played for laughs are legion. Prison rape has been reduced to a joke in films, from \textit{My Cousin Vinny} to \textit{Stir Crazy} to \textit{Let’s Go to Prison} to \textit{Naked Gun 33 1/3}. Prison rape has been reduced to a joke in commercials. See, e.g., Sabrina Qutb & Lara Stemple, \textit{Selling a Soft Drink, Surviving Hard Time: Just What Part of Prison Rape Do You Find Amusing?}, S.F. CHRON., June 9, 2002, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2002/06/09/IN181350.DTL (criticizing a soft drink commercial in which a delivery man refuses to bend over in front of inmates to pick up a dropped can). Television shows have also reduced prison rape to a joke. For example, a recurring skit on \textit{Saturday Night Live} features Keenan Thompson as a convicted felon telling juveniles about prison life. Each of his skits ends with a “humorous” story of prison rape.
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cconcern the prison officials showed Roderick Johnson. We treat prisons as invisible zones, as lawless zones, as zones that need not concern us.22

Outside the prison context, our response is no better. We tell ourselves male rape victimization is “exceedingly rare”23 or perhaps something that happens only to gay men. In short, we render male rape victimization invisible. Sodomy was once considered such an unspeakable crime that it was cloaked in euphemisms and rhetorical legerdemain. 24 This is now how we treat male-victim rape.25 A prime example is our response to the victimization of Abner Louima. On August 9, 1997, Louima was arrested following a verbal altercation with a police officer, Justin Volpe, during which another individual struck Volpe, knocking him down. Volpe responded by striking Louima repeatedly en route to the police precinct and by taking Louima into a bathroom where he forced a broken broomstick six inches into Louima’s rectum.26 Had Louima been female, we would have called this rape or at the very least sexual assault.27 Instead, we fell back on words that seemed easier and more consistent with male-on-male violence: police brutality.28 Nothing more. Nothing less.

22. In using the term “zones,” this Article borrows from the work of Gerald Neuman and Alexandra Natapoff, as well as my prior work. See I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 835, 837 (2008) (describing how the zone of law enforcement is also a zone of underenforcement, since officers can engage in “sanctionable and criminal behavior usually without fear of consequences”); Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1721 (2007) (noting that “the United States is peppered with underenforcement zones, arenas in which underenforcement has reached systemic proportions that affect the local quality and meaning of lawfulness”); Gerald L. Neuman, Anomalous Zones, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1201 (1996) (identifying Guantanamo, formal “red light districts,” and the District of Columbia as “anomalous zones” in which “certain legal rules, otherwise regarded as fundamental policies of the larger legal system, are locally suspended”).


24. Blackstone famously described same-sex sodomy as “the infamous crime against nature,” “the very mention of which is a disgrace to human nature,” and “a crime not fit to be named.” 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *215. As historian John Boswell has observed, it speaks volumes about the taboo of homosexuality that “[m]urder, matricide, child molesting, incest, cannibalism, genocide, even deicide” were named. JOHN BOSWELL, SAME-SEX UNIONS IN PRE-MODERN EUROPE xxiii (1994). For more on this “unnamability trope,” see Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915, 954–55 (1989).


27. Even the term “sodomized” was downplayed in the media. More to the point, “forced sodomy” continues to denote a male victim much the way “rape” denotes a female victim. Part of the goal of this Article is to make the argument that the name of the criminal act should not depend on the sex of the victim. Male-victim rape is rape.

28. See, e.g., Sewell Chan, The Abner Louima Case, 10 Years Later, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9,
Even legal scholars have turned a blind eye to male rape victimization. With few exceptions, scholars writing about rape have either ignored male-on-male rape entirely, confined their discussions to prison rape, or mentioned it only in passing. Susan Estrich, author of *Real Rape*, is typical of the latter. Estrich uses the term “real rape” (think traditional notions of nonconsensual, physically forced rape) to call attention to the criminal justice system’s relative indifference to simple rape (think acquaintance or marital rape). But in critiquing this disparate treatment, Estrich reifies another type of hierarchy, reducing male-victim rape to a footnote. One ambition of this Article is to bring male rape out of the footnote and into the body of the text—to render male rape visible. In short, one goal of this Article is to argue that male-victim rape is real rape, too.

On a broader level, the goal of this Article goes beyond calling attention to male-victim rape. This Article is also a critique of unjust silence and unjust talk. It is a critique of the unjust silence surrounding male rape victimization that permeates legal scholarship about rape. It is a critique of the unjust talk about the specter of male rape that too often permeates self-defense and provocation cases as well as state-suspect interactions. It is about how re-conceptualizing rape as a gender-neutral crime might help advocates of rape victimization fight for justice.
law reform forge new alliances. And it is about how incorporating the reality of male-victim rape can help us rethink rape law in general.

This Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the prevalence of male rape, both in prisons and outside of prisons. Part II explores two areas where the specter of male-on-male rape is talked about: in self-defense and provocation cases asserting what has come to be known as the “gay panic” defense and in “trash talk” during police interrogations. Part III explores the silence that otherwise surrounds male-victim rape, beginning with the common law definition of rape and ending with the especially troubling norm of silence that pervades feminist, queer, and critical race legal scholarship. Finally, Part IV argues that broadening our conception of rape to include male victims can reorient how we think about rape law—in terms of the rape statutes drafted by legislators, in terms of the rape law that is actually enforced by our criminal justice system, and in terms of the very meaning of rape itself.

What connects these four parts is an argument that rape law has been gendered for too long. Originally, it was gendered in a way that tilted the scales to benefit men—men as fathers, men as husbands, and men as rapists. Feminists were right to point out the sexism inherent in traditional rape laws in this country, though many, including Catharine MacKinnon, were wrong to view rape as solely a mechanism of male domination of women. But the real problem is that in arguing for reform, many feminist scholars have inadvertently legitimized and contributed to the very gender distinctions of which they have been so critical. In response to one form of subordination, they have entrenched another. Many rape statutes have been reformed so that they are gender neutral, but the application of those laws is still very much gendered. As a consequence, male victims have suffered. More broadly, the law of rape has suffered. And it shows.

I.
REAL VICTIMS

The first goal of this Article is to bring male sexual victimization out of the margins and, to a certain extent, out of the closet. This goal should be easy, given the prevalence of male sexual victimization. As discussed below, both in and out of prisons, male-victim rape is a daily occurrence. In short, the numbers are the argument.

37. This is not to suggest that all feminists resist gender distinctions. “Difference” feminists in fact champion such distinctions. See generally Martha Chamallas, Introduction to Feminist Theory 47–83 (1999) (discussing the various schools of feminist legal thought that came of age in the 1980s and their emphasis on difference).
A. Prison Rape

Determining the frequency of rape is notoriously difficult. Even when limited to rapes involving female victims and male perpetrators, there are large variations in collected data. Due largely to underreporting, figures on the commission of rape have shown as much as a five-fold disparity. Indeed, the American Law Institute suggests that rape is likely the most underreported crime of violence. A second problem is definitional. What constitutes rape as a matter of law varies from state to state.

These difficulties are compounded when it comes to ascertaining the frequency of male-on-male prison rape. Because of the fear of being perceived as weak, homosexual, or both, male victims of prison rape are even less likely than women to report sexual assaults. There are definitional hurdles as well. For example, some jurisdictions continue to define rape in gender-specific terms, specifying a female victim or vaginal penetration. The Uniform Crime Reporting Program—administered, until recently, by the F.B.I.—also defines rape as requiring a female victim.
Notwithstanding these hurdles, the data collected thus far suggest that rape and sexual assaults within the male prison system are endemic. Consider studies based on inmate surveys. In a 2000 study of male inmates at several prisons across four states, 21 percent of the inmates reported experiencing pressured or forced sexual contact, and 7 percent of the inmates reported they had been raped. A study of male inmates in Nebraska revealed similar rates of victimization: 22 percent of the male inmates in Nebraska reported pressured or forced sex. Of these, over 50 percent reported being the victim of forced anal sex. A study of prisoners in three Midwestern states found that approximately 20 percent of inmates reported pressured or forced sex, and 10 percent reported they had been raped. These inmate surveys are also consistent with estimates by corrections officers. An “anonymous” survey of corrections officers in one southern state is revealing: the officers estimated that roughly one-fifth of all prisoners were being coerced into sex with other inmates.

In the last several years, more systematic efforts have been made to gather data on the prevalence of male sexual victimization in U.S. prisons. This is largely a result of the passage of the “mostly hortatory” Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 (“PREA”). PREA, among other things, mandates data collection as a first step to a longer-term and clearly idealistic goal of preventing rape in prison. The data collected to date confirm the prevalence of inmate sexual victimization. Numbers collected by the U.S. Department of Justice indicate that 4.5 percent of inmates report being sexually victimized during the prior twelve months, with inmates at several facilities reporting victimization rates during the last twelve months in excess of 9 percent. Overall, numbers collected by the Department of Justice indicate that 13 percent of all inmates in the United States have been sexually victimized in prison.

48. Id.
50. The state provided this information to Human Rights Watch on the condition that the name of the state would not be revealed. NO ESCAPE, supra note 12, at 33.
51. Id.
52. Ristroph, supra note 31, at 175.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 15603(a)-(c) (requiring the Bureau of Justice Statistics to collect data and issue regular reports on prison rape). For a critique of PREA and its likely effect, see Ristroph, supra note 31, at 174–76.
56. Although this Article focuses on adult male victims, the data on the sexual victimization of male youth in juvenile facilities is even more troubling. According to a
These numbers alone support the argument that male-victim rape requires more attention. But in all likelihood, these numbers drastically understate the frequency of male rape in prisons. The remainder of this section explains why.

In addition to the reporting hurdles already discussed—the fear of negative perceptions and the definitional issues—there are perceptual hurdles. For example, the prisoner who engages in sex with one individual to avoid physical harm from third-parties may have difficulty squaring his predicament with his preconceived notion of rape.57 Similarly, when a victim of rape ejaculates or is forced to play a “dominant” role in the sexual act, perhaps by being the recipient of fellatio, he may feel guilt or embarrassment and have difficulty reconciling his role with his perception of a rape victim.58 In a similar vein, a victim of prison rape may have trouble reconciling his rape with his conceptions of sexuality and masculinity. Contrary to assumptions, it appears that most perpetrators of prison rape identify as heterosexual, engaged in heterosexual sex prior to prison, and return to heterosexual sex after prison.59 Indeed, within the prison, the aggressor in prison rape is often “viewed as the model of heterosexual masculinity.”60 Likewise, a male rape victim who assumed that rape was something that only happens to women might experience cognitive dissonance, and he might resolve this dissonance by viewing his experience as a physical violation, but not a sexual one.

Department of Justice study released in 2010, approximately 10.8 percent of detained youth reported sexual activity with staff members, and nearly 3 percent reported being sexually victimized by other detained youth. Of the youths victimized by other youth, 81 percent reported being victimized more than once; 32 percent reported being victimized more than ten times; and 43 percent reported being victimized by more than one perpetrator. Id.

57. As one commentator notes, much of prison sex is “survival driven.” Stephen “Donny” Donaldson, A Million Jockers, Punks, and Queens, in PRISON MASCULINITIES, supra note 32, at 118, 120–25. See also Sigler, By the Light of Virtue, supra note 31, at 569–70 (observing that “strong incentives, such as obtaining protection and avoiding other forms of violence . . . lead some inmates to be coerced into ‘consensual’ sexual relationships”). There is also evidence that some inmates, in order to avoid being sexually victimized, resort to preemptive aggression by sexually victimizing others. Ristroph, supra note 31, at 153–54.

58. The physiological response of an erection and ejaculation during sexual assault is not uncommon, as several studies have revealed. See, e.g., Philip M. Sarrel & William H. Masters, Sexual Molestation of Men by Women, 11 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 117, 118 (1982). As two researchers observed:

A major strategy used by some offenders in the assault of males is to get the victim to ejaculate. This effort may have several purposes. In misidentifying ejaculation with orgasm, the victim may be bewildered by his physiological response to the offense and thus discouraged from reporting the assault for fear his sexuality may become suspect. Such a reaction may serve to impeach his credibility in trial testimony and discredit his allegation of nonconsent. To the offender, such a reaction may symbolize his ultimate and complete sexual control over his victim’s body and confirm his fantasy that the victim really wanted and enjoyed the rape.

A. Nicholas Groth & Ann Wolbert Burgess, Male Rape: Offenders and Victims, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 806, 809 (1980).

59. ALAN MCEVOY ET AL., IF HE IS RAPED 12 (2003); King, Male Rape in Institutional Settings, supra note 11, at 71.

In addition, the mere act of reporting rape in the prison system may present risks.\(^6\) Victims of prison rape are, by definition, limited in their ability to extricate themselves from the environment where they were raped. In many circumstances, the perpetrator is not only a fellow prisoner but also the victim’s administratively chosen cellmate.\(^6\)2 There are no rape shelters in prison or readily available rape kits.\(^6\)3 Prisoners who report being raped often find themselves being victimized again, either by being placed in administrative detention or protective custody,\(^6\)4 or by their rapists as retaliation for “snitching.”\(^6\)5 Corrections officers may even be complicit in facilitating rapes in order to punish certain prisoners and reward others.\(^6\)6 More often, corrections officers “blame the victim,” dismissing the victim as culpable in having attracted the sexual assault,\(^6\)7 especially if corrections officers perceive the victim to be gay or bisexual. For example, one survey of 166 corrections officers found that 46.4 percent of the officers believed “inmates deserve rape if they have consented to participate in consensual acts with other inmates.”\(^6\)8

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61. One study found that only 29 percent of sexually victimized inmates reported their abuse to prison officials. See Cindy Struckman-Johnson et al., *Sexual Coercion Reported by Men and Women in Prison*, 33 J. SEX RES. 67, 75 (1996).

62. *No Escape*, supra note 12, at 75 (“One relationship that presents a clear danger of sexual abuse . . . is that of cellmates.”).


64. Another administrative response might be to transfer the victim to another institution. As Mark Fleisher and Jessie Krienert note, both administrative detentions and transfers can leave an inmate in a worse position. Protective custody usually involves the victim being placed in solitary confinement with twenty-three-hour-a-day lockdown and unable to take advantage of any privileges he previously enjoyed. A transfer usually involves an inmate being perceived as a victim and an easy target for rape and other abuse when he arrives at another institution. See *Mark S. Fleisher & Jessie L. Krienert, The Myth of Prison Rape: Sexual Culture in American Prisons* 99 (2009).

65. Terry A. Kupers, *Rape and the Prison Code, in Prison Masculinities*, supra note 32, at 111–12. Interviews with inmates resulted in comments such as “they’re afraid of being labeled a snitch or something like that,” and “you don’t [report rape], you wouldn’t deal with a rape by telling an officer.” Another inmate explained, “Nothing reported; nothing said about it. It’s too embarrassing; you’re admitting to defeat and can’t take care of yourself; you’re like a little kid.” Id. at 121.


68. H. Eigenberg, *Male Rape: An Empirical Examination of Correctional Officers’*
Seeking civil relief, assuming the victim can find a lawyer to take his case, presents its own hurdles. Nor can the victim of prison rape expect the usual criminal justice protections that exist outside of prisons. Prosecutors, faced with limited resources, rarely devote those resources to prosecuting prison violence. These disincentives to reporting prison rape are considerable. As a result, prisons function as zones of underenforcement, where sanctionable and criminal behavior frequently occur without criminal consequences.

At the same time that male inmates face disincentives to report sexual victimization, prison officials have a vested interest in underreporting the occurrence of rape. For example, prison officials in New Mexico stated their systems contained no rape complaints. Similarly, officials in Nevada claimed such incidents were “minimal.” In fact, states have reported no and few incidents of inmate sexual violence even while being under public investigation for ongoing sexual violence. Part of this disincentive to reporting is traceable to the possible civil liability prison officials face in suits alleging that officials failed to protect a prisoner from interprisoner abuse. Under the “deliberate indifference” standard articulated in Farmer v. Brennan, a prison official’s liability for prisoner

69. See infra notes 77 through 78 and accompanying text.
70. For example, in Butler v. Dowd, a corrections employee testified that there had been over one hundred reports of sexual assaults at the prison; however, evidence showed that the prison superintendent “had never referred a case of sexual assault for prosecution.” Butler v. Dowd, 979 F.2d 661, 667 (8th Cir 1992); see also Brenda V. Smith, Prosecuting Sexual Violence in Correctional Settings: Examining Prosecutors’ Perceptions, 4 CRIM. L. BRIEF 19, 20 (2008).
71. As one commentator observed:
Few prosecutors are concerned with prosecuting crimes committed against prisoners; preferring to leave internal prison problems to the discretion of the prison authorities; similarly, prison officials themselves rarely push for the prosecution of prisoner-on-prisoner abuses. As a result, perpetrators of prison rape almost never face criminal charges.

Joanne Mariner, Deliberate Indifference, State Authorities’ Response to Prisoner-on-Prisoner Sexual Abuse, in PRISON NATION: THE WAREHOUSING OF AMERICA’S POOR, supra note 66, at 232; see also Mark Hansen, Brutal Findings: Prison Rapists Go Unpunished, Victims Go Unrepresented, A.B.A. J., July 2001, at 16; NO ESCAPE, supra note 12, at vii (“Although local prosecutors are nominally responsible for prosecuting criminal acts that occur in prisons, they are unlikely to consider prisoners part of their real constituency.”)). Unfortunately, both civil and criminal relief are frustrated by evidentiary rules that automatically mark the vast majority of prisoners as untrustworthy because of their felony convictions, a problem I have detailed elsewhere. See Bennett Capers [sic], Crime, Legitimacy, Our Criminal Network, and The Wire, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 459 (2011).
72. Jeremy Bentham imagined the ideal prison as a panopticon, where officials would be able to monitor prisoners at all times. While our prisons move closer to this ideal every day—indeed, increased surveillance is one of the solutions PREA proposes—inmate sexual victimization remains one area where prisons seem to deliberately turn a blind eye. Mariner, supra note 71, at 234. As one state corrections official stated: “Regrettably, [rape] is a problem of which we are happier not knowing the true dimensions.” Id. at 233.
73. NO ESCAPE, supra note 12, at 4.
74. Id.
rape is limited. Although 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ostensibly provides a cause of action against state actors for civil rights deprivations, absent intentional wrongdoing on the part of the state actor, the state actor is liable only if he had actual knowledge of substantial risk to a prisoner and disregarded that risk. This legal standard creates an incentive for correctional staff to remain officially unaware of inmate sexual victimization.

The foregoing suggests that data collected to date likely underestimate the frequency of male-victim rape in prisons. Still, even assuming the existing numbers are accurate, they should be cause enough for alarm. Based on Congress’s own numbers, “nearly 200,000 inmates now incarcerated have been, or will be, the victims of rape,” and the total estimate of “inmates who

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76. 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994) (holding, in the case of a transsexual inmate who was repeatedly beaten and raped by inmates, that “a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.”).

77. Id. at 841. For more on the “deliberate indifference” standard in the context of male prison rape, see Christopher D. Man & John P. Cronan, Forecasting Sexual Abuse in Prison: The Prison Subculture of Masculinity as a Backdrop for “Deliberate Indifference,” 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 127 (2001); James E. Robertson, A Clean Heart and an Empty Head: The Supreme Court and Sexual Terrorism in Prison, 81 N.C. L. REV. 433 (2003). Numerous cases illustrate the difficulty of prevailing under this standard and the lack of sympathy plaintiff-inmates often receive. See, e.g., Riccardo v. Rausch, 375 F.3d 521, 526–27 (7th Cir. 2004) (reversing award of $1.5 million to inmate who was raped after imploring officials not to be assigned with a particular inmate because he feared for his life; since inmate complained only that he feared for his life, and not that he feared rape, officials did not have actual knowledge of the risk of rape); Butler v. Dowd, 979 F.2d 661, 671 (8th Cir. 1992) (affirming jury award of one dollar each to several plaintiffs who were repeatedly raped in part on the ground that the jury could have concluded that “the plaintiffs’ actions, not those of the defendant, were the cause in fact of most of the plaintiffs’ injuries”; the court also noted that the plaintiffs had failed to introduce medical evidence that they “were in fact damaged by their experience”); McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 348, 353 (7th Cir. 1991) (reversing the jury’s award of $10,000 to an inmate who was anally raped in the shower by several other inmates because the victim had failed to show that officials had actual knowledge of the risk and because the victim “accept[ed] the risk” of rape when he proceeded to the shower after other inmates had made sexual threats; James v. Tilghman, 194 F.R.D. 408, 412–13 (D. Conn. 1999) (even though the jury accepted inmate’s claim that officials acted with deliberate indifference by housing him in a cell with an inmate who other inmates had complained about and who thereafter raped plaintiff, it only awarded one dollar in damages). The McGill court noted that “[s]ome level of brutality and sexual aggression among [inmates] is inevitable no matter what the guards do.”). McGill, 944 F.2d at 348. The Roderick Johnson case, described in the Introduction, ended with a jury verdict in favor of the defendants on all counts. It appears that jurors expected Johnson to demonstrate that he physically resisted his rapists and that he had not previously engaged in consensual homosexual sex. See Angela K. Brown, Jurors Reject Texas Prison Rape Lawsuit, ASSOC. PRESS, Oct. 18, 2005 (quoting juror who concluded that Johnson was “probably” raped, but wanted evidence from a rape kit for confirmation). Jurors may have also had trouble reconciling the notion that Johnson could be raped with evidence that Johnson had previously engaged in consensual homosexual sex. Robert Crowe, Prison Workers Not Liable in Lawsuit, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 19, 2005, at B7 (noting defense lawyers’ references to Johnson’s sexuality).

78. Mariner, supra note 71, at 234. As one state corrections official stated: “Regrettably, [rape] is a problem of which we are happier not knowing the true dimensions.” Id. at 233.
have been assaulted in the past 20 years likely exceeds 1,000,000.\textsuperscript{79} Even these numbers still obscure the reality of gang rapes and repeated victimization.\textsuperscript{80} Once victimized, a prison rape victim often “must repay his rapist for the violence perpetrated on him by dedicating himself to serving his assailant’s needs for perhaps years thereafter.”\textsuperscript{81} They also obscure the perpetual fear of being raped that many inmates feel. As the book \textit{If He Is Raped} puts it:

The reality of prison culture is clear: incarcerated victims of sexual violence live in a continued state of preimpact terror. . . . [P]risoners who are preyed upon by other prisoners experience this terror almost daily. They seldom feel safe. In addition, this terror is induced intentionally rather than by accident. The places where people on the outside feel safest—at home, in the shower, at play, or while asleep—are places where inmates are most vulnerable. There is no respite. In the confines of the prison, victims and predators see one another daily. Even guards and other prison staff, not just fellow prisoners, can be perpetrators.\textsuperscript{82}

\textbf{B. Rape Outside of Prisons}

On October 3, 2010, in New York City, several gang members abducted a seventeen-year-old boy who had been trying to join their gang, forced him to confess that he had performed sex acts with a thirty-year-old man, and punished him by beating him and sodomizing him with the wooden handle of a plunger. The gang members then located the thirty-year-old man, beat him, and sodomized him with a small baseball bat.\textsuperscript{83}

While this incident shocked many, current data suggest that male sexual victimization occurs outside of prisons with far greater frequency than commonly assumed. For example, the most recent National Crime Victimization Survey, released in September 2009, indicates that 39,590 men reported being raped or sexually assaulted in 2008.\textsuperscript{84}

\textsuperscript{80} Approximately two-thirds of prison rape victims are repeatedly raped, many on a daily basis. \textit{Michael Scarcé, Male on Male Rape: The Hidden Toll of Stigma and Shame} 36–37 (1997). The story of Donald Stephenson is but one example. Arrested for participating in a nonviolent protest in Washington, D.C., Donaldson found himself in a jail where approximately sixty men raped him over a twenty-four hour period. \textit{Id.} at 36. Upon his release, he spent a week in a veteran’s hospital undergoing and recovering from rectal surgery. Based on his experience, Donaldson became an advocate against prison rape and founded the organization Stop Prison Rape. \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{81} \textit{King, Male Rape in Institutional Settings, supra} note 11, at 68.
\textsuperscript{82} \textit{McEvoy, supra} note 59, at 59.
\textsuperscript{84} Rand, \textit{supra} note 14 (2008 victimization survey). The survey was based on information gathered from a nationally representative sample of U.S. households. Surveyors interviewed 77,852 individuals from 42,093 households.
Other recent data confirm the prevalence of male-victim rape outside of prisons. For example, a community-wide study in Los Angeles found that 7.2 percent of the men surveyed reported at least one incident after the age of 15 where they had been sexually assaulted. Other research, focusing on cases in hospital emergency rooms and rape crisis centers, indicates that between 4 percent and 12 percent of sexual assault victims seeking medical treatment are male. Indeed, research suggests that a significant percentage of male sexual victimization occurs in hypermasculine environments, including fraternities and sports teams. A study based in a clinic serving a population of Navy and Marine Corp men found significant male sexual victimization in the military setting. A more recent study found a 6.7 percent victimization rate among male members of the U.S. Army. This is to say nothing of servicemen abusing male civilians, as the sexualized victimization of many of the male prisoners at Abu Ghraib attests to.

As with rates of sexual victimization within prisons, the data regarding male-victim rape outside of prisons are also likely conservative. The reasons...

86. See Bruce D. Forman, Reported Male Rape, 7 VICTIMOLOGY 235 (1982); Patricia A. Frazier, A Comparative Study of Male and Female Rape Victims Seen at a Hospital-Based Rape Crisis Program, 8 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 64 (1993); Cécile Grossin et al., Analysis of 418 Cases of Sexual Assault, 131 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 125 (2003); Arthur Kaufman et al., Male Rape Victims: Noninstitutionalized Assault, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 221 (1980); Gene R. Pesola et al., Emergency Department Characteristics of Male Sexual Assault, 6 ACAD. EMER. MED. 92 (1999); Netti Riggs et al., Analysis of 1,076 Cases of Sexual Assault, 35 ANNALS EMER. MED. 358–60 (2000); Lana Stermac et al., Sexual Assault of Adult Males, 11 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 52 (1996).
87. For example, a surprising number of male-victim sexual assaults, including gang rapes, occur in fraternities, ostensibly as part of hazing rituals. McEvoy, supra note 59, at 13. (discussing gang rapes in the context of hazing); see also Scarce, supra note 80, at 51–56 (discussing male sexual victimization in fraternities).
for underreporting among men outside of prisons are similar to the reasons for
underreporting within the prison system: the taint of homophobia; the fear of
appearing weak and hence not masculine; and definitional and perceptual
issues.92

Additionally, there are underreporting factors unique to nonprison male
rape victims.93 While complaints of prison rape are likely to be dismissed as
“par for the course,” complaints of male-victim rape outside of the prison
context are more likely to be met with disbelief.94 As one victim of male rape
put it, “All men find rape difficult to believe or accept—if [it happened] you
must be queer, if you’re not queer it can’t have happened.”95 There are
assumptions about prison rape that are so embedded in the popular culture—
jokes about dropping the soap or about a cellmate named “Bubba”96—that the
specter of prison rape already fits a certain prison “rape script.”97 These
assumptions, often racially inflected,98 have little counterpart outside of the

92. This seems particularly true of male victims who are fondled or otherwise brought to
arousal or ejaculation during the assault. King’s study of male rape victims indicates that men who
were manually fondled during assaults often remained confused and disgusted by their
physiological response. Michael B. King, Male Sexual Assault in the Community, in MALE
VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT, supra note 11, at 5. As with prison rape, most men who sexually
assault other men outside of prisons appear to identify as heterosexual. SCARCE, supra note 80, at
17. There may also be an additional perceptual issue with respect to sexual assaults outside of
prisons. Since straight men do not usually think of their rectal cavities as sexual, they may not
think of a forced insertion of a foreign object in the anus as a sexual assault. In such cases, the
men may view themselves as assault victims, but not sexual assault victims. Id. at 62.

93. A British study of callers to a support group for victims of male rape found that only 11
percent of the callers had reported their assaults to the police. See Philip N.S. Rumney, Police
Male Rape and Sexual Assault, 72 J. CRIM. L. 67, 70 (2008).

94. Tewksbury, supra note 15, at 25 (observing that “implicit is the belief that [male]
Victims anticipate rejection and authorities not to believe them if they should report”). One study
examining attrition rates found that allegations of male-victim rape are less likely to be recorded
as crimes by the police. This study, which focused on attrition rates in London, England, found
that 23 percent of the sexual assault allegations made by females were recorded as “No Crime.”
By comparison, 41 percent of the sexual assault allegations made by males were recorded as “No
Crime.” See Rumney, supra note 93, at 71 (citing DEPUTY COMMISSIONER’S COMMAND,
DIRECTORATE OF STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT AND TERRITORIAL POLICING, PROJECT SAPPHIRE,
A REVIEW OF RAPE INVESTIGATIONS IN THE MPS (2005)).

95. King, Male Sexual Assault in the Community, supra note 92, at 5.

96. “Bubba” even has an entry in the Urban Dictionary. See URBAN DICTIONARY,
“Bubba” as a “homosexual gay beast who finds men’s bums attractive and must rape them”
who loves to “de-virginize prison newbies”).

97. Sharon Marcus uses this term to refer to the typical script of a stranger rape. Sharon
seems equally apt in the male-victim rape context to describe the type of violent rape we associate
with prisons.

98. Tellingly, “Bubba” is usually assumed to be black. See URBAN DICTIONARY, supra
note 96 (alternatively describing “Bubba” as a “male in prison, usually black, who is 7+ feet,
weights 350+ pounds of muscle” and as the “muscular black guy in prison that makes others
prisoner [sic] into his bitch”); see also JAMES HOGSHIRE, YOU ARE GOING TO PRISON (describing
prison rapists as “almost all black, while punks [i.e., sex slaves] are almost all white”).
prison context where men are assumed to be able to fend for themselves or at least escape.99 As Michael Scarce observes in Male on Male Rape:

We can easily believe that a child might not be able to defend himself against an adult, but the sexual violation of a man may come as something of a shock, for men have traditionally been expected to defend their own boundaries and limits while maintaining control, especially sexual control, of their own bodies. When this does not occur, when men are raped by other men, society tends to silence and erase them rather than acknowledge the vulnerability of masculinity and manhood.100

The fact that reporting agencies are often gendered in name—e.g., Crisis Center for Women—may also function as a barrier to male victimization reporting.101 Agencies are often unequipped to address male victimization,102 ill at ease in providing services to male victims, and sometimes explicitly refuse services to male victims.103 Some agencies may view the mere presence of a male as a barrier to the help they provide to female victims.

If male-victim rape occurs in an environment where homosexuality is stigmatized or penalized, reporting may become even more difficult. Consider again the military context. Because of the military’s Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy, which until recently mandated the dismissal of any openly gay or bisexual service member,104 even a heterosexual victim of male sexual assault risked being victimized twice. If he reported the assault, he risked the very real possibility of having his sexuality questioned, possibly leading to dismissal.105

99. Studies suggest that male victims of rape may be judged more harshly precisely because of the assumption that they can defend themselves or escape. See, e.g., Michelle Davies et al., The Influence of Victim Gender and Sexual Orientation on Judgments of the Victim in a Depicted Stranger Rape, 16 VIOLENCE AND VICTIMS 607 (2001).

100. SCARCE, supra note 80, at 9.


102. One study found that only 5 percent of victim services agencies that serve male victims have any programs or services specifically designed for men. See P.A. Washington, Second Assault of Male Survivors of Sexual Violence, 14 J. OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 713–30 (1999).


104. 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (1994). In fact, gays have historically been barred from serving in the military since World War II. For a discussion of this history, see ALLAN BERUBE, COMING OUT UNDER FIRE: THE HISTORY OF GAY MEN AND WOMEN IN WORLD WAR II (1990). DADT was repealed by the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010 Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515 (2010). However, the law does not become effective until 60 days after the President, SECDEF, and CJCS report to Congress that changing the law will not adversely affect military readiness. Id. A couple of sources have indicated such certification may come by mid-summer. See, e.g., Pentagon Says Certification on ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ Likely Mid-Summer, LGBTQATION (Sept. 1, 2011, 6:12 PM), http://www.lgbtqnation.com/2011/04/breaking-dod-says-certification-on-dont-ask-dont-tell-like-mid-summer/.

105. On the difficulties male members of the military face coming forward about sexual assault, see for example, Bill Sizeman, Military Men Are Silent Victims of Sexual Assault, VIRGINIAN-Pilot, Oct. 5, 2009, http://hamptonroads.com/2009/10/military-men-are-silent-
Just as the military’s ban on openly gay or bisexual servicemen likely inhibited the reporting of male sexual victimization in the military, the existence, until recently, of laws prohibiting sodomy likely had the unintended effect of inhibiting the reporting of male rape victimization. Before 1961, all fifty states had laws criminalizing same-sex sexual intercourse. Moreover, in Bowers v. Hardwick\textsuperscript{106} in 1986, the Supreme Court gave its imprimatur to those laws, many of which remained extant until 2003 when the Supreme Court reversed Bowers in Lawrence v. Texas.\textsuperscript{107} These laws had particularly grave consequences for gay and bisexual victims of sexual assault. Prior to Lawrence, to report an assault in many jurisdictions was to also “turn oneself in” as a violator of the sodomy laws.\textsuperscript{108} These laws had consequences for heterosexual victims of same-sex assault as well, since even heterosexual men risked having their sexuality questioned and being deemed criminals.

Because male-victim rape outside the prison context has been largely invisible, the remainder of this section seeks to contextualize nonprison rape. One of the most well known studies of male rape victims outside the prison context was conducted by Michael King, a psychiatrist at the Royal Free Hospital in London.\textsuperscript{109} Although over a decade old and based on a small sample of male victims, his findings are illuminating nonetheless. King provided detailed questionnaires to twenty-two men who responded to a call for male assault victims. Each of the men was assured absolute confidentiality.\textsuperscript{110} Eight of the men also made themselves available for in-person interviews.\textsuperscript{111} The questionnaires and interviews revealed the following:

- The mean age at the time of attack was 26.3 years.
- Ten victims self-identified as gay, four as bisexual, and eight as heterosexual at the time of the assault.
- Four men (two homosexual and two heterosexual) were attacked by complete strangers. Six were assaulted by someone well known to them. Five were assaulted by acquaintances, known for only a few hours. The remainder were sexually assaulted by either someone they met, knew romantically, or by a family member.

\textsuperscript{106} 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
\textsuperscript{107} 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Thirteen states had laws criminalizing sodomy at the time. \textit{Id.} at 559.
\textsuperscript{108} This remained true for gay and bisexual men whatever their sexual practices. As Janet Halley observes, we tend to conflate the act of sodomy with the status of being gay or bisexual, even when such conflation is unwarranted. As she puts it, “in the relation of metonymy, sodomy is to homosexual identity as burglary is to burglars.” Janet Halley, \textit{Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity in and After Bowers v. Hardwick}, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1734 (1993). As such, an admission of gay or bisexual identity could be understood as an admission “of membership in a criminal—or at least criminalizable—class.” \textit{Id.} at 1733.
\textsuperscript{109} See King, \textit{Male Sexual Assault in the Community}, supra note 92, at 3–8.
\textsuperscript{110} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{111} \textit{Id.}
• Several men were sexually assaulted by someone who held emotional or more formal sway over them. For example, one bisexual married man was attacked by a man who advertised himself as a counselor for married gay men. Another man was sexually assaulted by an Army officer of higher rank.

• Seventeen men were the victims of forced anal intercourse. Three men were victims of attempted anal intercourse. Of the remaining two men, one was forced to perform oral sex on his attacker, and the other was indecently assaulted as part of a physical attack. Five perpetrators attempted to masturbate their victims.

• Twelve men believed they were about to be killed by their attacker. Many reacted to the shock of the assault with frozen helplessness, and still had difficulty understanding why they had been so afraid or unable to escape. Each felt stigma and disbelief following the attack.

• Only two men reported the attacks to the police. The remainder feared that the police would either incorrectly perceive them to be gay, or correctly identify them as gay and respond with homophobia. Although several of the men sought psychological counseling after the attack, they found it difficult to report the attack. Only two of the men seeing psychiatrists revealed the attack to their psychiatrists.112

Though King’s sample is concededly small and may suffer from a self-selection bias,113 it suggests that male sexual victimization outside of prisons is as varied and multifaceted as female sexual victimization.114 But the larger point is this: All of this is rape. All of this is sexual victimization. And all of this happens with far more frequency than we tend to acknowledge, suggesting that male-victim rape is cloaked in silence much the way female-victim rape was cloaked in silence fifty years ago. So here is the question: If men are raped with such frequency, why don’t we talk about it? Even as I ask this question, however, a curious answer presses itself: we talk about it all the time.

112. Id.
113. Because of the taint of homophobia, it may be that openly gay men were more willing to come forward than heterosexual men to discuss their sexual victimization, thus skewing the percentage of gay respondents. In addition, King solicited respondents by placing ads in LGBT-interest newspapers as well as in general interest newspapers. This may also have skewed the results. See id.
114. See also Philip N.S. Rumney, In Defence of Gender Neutrality Within Rape, 6 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 481, 507 (2007) (surveying literature and concluding that “there are marked similarities in the responses of adult men and women to rape”). In addition, at least one court has recognized “[m]ale rape trauma syndrome,” relying on scientific consensus that “male victims, both heterosexual and homosexual, exhibit a well defined trauma syndrome similar to and parallel to that found in female victims of rape.” People v. Yates, 637 N.Y.S.2d 625, 627, 628 (1995).
II.

UNJUST TALK

Among legal scholars and practitioners, male-victim rape has been largely invisible and rarely discussed. Some of us, however—and here I am referring specifically to those of us involved in the practice of criminal law—talk about male-victim rape a lot. To be clear, we do not talk about it in ways that take seriously the concerns of actual rape victims. When we talk about male rape, for the most part, it is not because we care about male rape or its actual victims. It is because male rape is something we can use strategically. When we talk about male rape, we do so to get what we want. This Part is about how we talk about male rape to our advantage.

There are two areas where talk about male-victim rape is surprisingly common. The first area is in self-defense and provocation cases asserting what has come to be known as the “gay panic” defense. The second area is in “trash” talk from law enforcement officers and prosecutors. Both kinds of talk are problematic. And, as I argue below, both are unjust.

A. “Gay Panic” Talk

In October 1998, Matthew Shepard, an openly gay student at the University of Wyoming, was at the Fireside Lounge Bar when he struck up a conversation with two young men, Aaron McKinney and Russell Henderson. Hours later, the police found Shepard’s beaten and bloodied body hanging from a wooden fence about a mile outside of Laramie, Wyoming. McKinney and Henderson were quickly arrested and charged with Shepard’s murder. Henderson pleaded guilty. McKinney, on the other hand, went to trial.

Though the judge explicitly barred McKinney from mounting a “gay panic” provocation defense, this was precisely the defense McKinney asserted throughout the trial. In opening statements, defense counsel claimed that it was Shepard’s homosexual advance that caused McKinney to react as he did. During the defense case, two other men were called to testify that

116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
Shepard had once made sexual passes at them, prompting one of the men to punch Shepard, knocking him out. In closing arguments, defense counsel again returned to the theme that McKinney had been provoked by Shepard’s sexual advance. In the end, the jury acquitted McKinney of first-degree murder, apparently accepting his claim that he reacted with panic and therefore lacked the intention to kill. Instead, they convicted him of felony murder, which dispenses with any mens rea requirement vis-à-vis a homicide.

The Matthew Shepard case is well known, but it is far from an isolated case. According to the F.B.I., there were 1,436 instances of hate crimes against lesbians and gays in 2009. Significantly, “gay panic” has become a common defense strategy in cases involving “heterosexual” men accused of killing or physically assaulting “gay” men. To be clear, the “gay panic” defense is not an independently recognized defense. Instead, like the “battered spouse
syndrome,” it is a particularized strategy used to buttress some other recognized defense. Originally, it was invoked to buttress the recognized defenses of insanity and diminished capacity.129 It is now invoked to buttress the recognized defenses of provocation and self-defense.130 Accordingly, a brief discussion of those defenses is helpful. In general, the self-defense doctrine allows a nonaggressor to use force upon another if he reasonably believes such force is necessary to protect himself from the imminent use of unlawful force by another person.131 The defense allows a defendant to respond with nondeadly force or, if faced with imminent deadly force or the threat of deadly force, to respond with deadly force.132 The defense functions as a complete defense.133

The provocation defense is more limited. It can be invoked only in cases resulting in a homicide.134 It operates as an excuse rather than as a justification.135 And it functions solely as a partial defense, permitting a defendant accused of committing intentional murder to mitigate his crime to the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter in situations where the defendant acted in the “sudden heat of passion” as the result of “adequate provocation.”136 The defense traditionally contains four elements: (1) the defendant must have in fact acted in the heat of passion; (2) the passion must have been the result of adequate provocation; (3) the defendant must not have had a reasonable opportunity to cool off; and (4) there must be a causal link between the

129. For a comprehensive discussion of the historical origins of the “gay panic” defense and its use in the context of insanity and diminished capacity defenses, see Lee, supra note 127, at 482–88, 491–99.

130. In fact, in the case of provocation and self-defense, “gay panic” is perhaps a misnomer. While “gay panic” was originally used in insanity and diminished capacity cases to refer to the psychotic reaction of the defendant, in provocation and self-defense cases, by contrast, the term appears to refer more to the defendant’s response to a nonviolent sexual advance. For more on this distinction and on why the term “homosexual advance defense” is more accurate, see Mison, supra note 128, at 134 n.6.


132. Id. Under the Model Penal Code, deadly force may also be used to avert rape. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b).

133. DRESSLER, supra note 131, at 249.

134. Id. at 571.

135. Of course, some scholars have argued that provocation should be thought of as a partial justification, in the sense that we consider the defendants were justified in responding to the wrong of the victim. See, e.g., Susan D. Rozelle, Controlling Passion: Adultery and the Provocation Defense, 37 RUTGERS L. J. 197 (2005). While this argument has some merit, the stronger argument is that we mitigate an intentional homicide to manslaughter in recognition of the weakness of the defendant, thus sounding as an excuse defense. For more on this debate, see Joshua Dressler, Provocation: Partial Justification or Partial Excuse, 51 MOD. L. REV. 467 (1988); Joshua Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a Rationale, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421 (1982).

136. DRESSLER, supra note 131, at 571. The Model Penal Code applies a slightly different formulation, mitigating murder to manslaughter if committed “under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse.” See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b).
provocation, the passion, and the homicide. Under this formulation, a defendant charged with murder can be convicted of the lesser offense of manslaughter so long as a reasonable person in the defendant’s shoes would also have been provoked into a heat of passion.

In recent years, it has become common for heterosexual men accused of killing or injuring gay men to claim they acted in self-defense or were provoked because they reasonably feared sexual assault. And it has been common for juries to side with those defendants.

Consider Schick v. Indiana. Timothy Schick, the seventeen-year old defendant, claimed that he stomped thirty-eight-year old Stephen Lamie until he heard gurgling sounds coming from his chest and throat and then robbed him, making sure to wipe his fingerprints from Lamie’s car. Schick claimed this was because Lamie, whom the defendant met while hitchhiking, had grabbed him around the waist and tried to touch his penis. Later, Schick claimed that Lamie attacked him, knocking him unconscious, and tried to force his penis into his mouth. In short, the defendant recast himself as a victim terrified of sexual assault, provoked into killing his victim. Apparently finding Schick’s sexual assault talk persuasive and his fear of sexual assault reasonable, the jury acquitted Schick of murder, convicting him instead of the lesser charge of voluntary manslaughter.

137. DRESSLER, supra note 131, at 571. While the very early common law limited “adequate provocation” to a fixed list of categories—observation of spousal infidelity; an aggressive assault or battery; mutual combat; illegal arrest; and the commission of a serious crime against a close relative, id. at 572–73, by the late nineteenth century this limitation had been largely abandoned. Rather, recognizing the “myriad shifting circumstances of men’s temper and quarrels,” Commonwealth v. Paese, 69 A.2d 891, 892 (Pa. 1908), jurisdictions began to let jurors determine what constitutes adequate provocation.

138. Courts have used various formulations to instruct jurors on determining whether provocation is adequate to reduce an intentional killing to voluntary manslaughter. Formulations include if it “would render any ordinarily prudent person for the time being incapable of that cool reflection that otherwise makes it murder,” Addington v. United States, 165 U.S. 184, 186 (1897); if it “might render ordinary men, of fair average disposition, liable to act rashly or without due deliberation or reflection, and from passion, rather than judgment,” Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 220 (1862); if it is “sufficient to cause an ordinary man to lose control of his actions and his reason,” State v. Guebara, 696 P.2d 381, 385 (Kan. 1985); or if it is “calculated to inflame the passion of a reasonable [person] and tends to cause [that person] to act for the moment from passion rather than reason,” Dennis v. State, 661 A.2d 175, 179 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995).


140. See Lee, supra note 127, at 478, 512 (observing that “gay panic arguments linked to claims of provocation have been relatively successful” and “resonate with juries”).

142. Id. at 922.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 927.
145. Id. at 922.
David Mills, another seventeen-year old defendant, also claimed fear of sexual assault to secure an acquittal on murder charges. In Mills v. Shepard, David Mills claimed that an older man’s attempt to have sex with him by grabbing his privates so provoked him that he beat the older man to death and then robbed him. In short, Mills argued that he had been provoked by the threat of sexual assault. Apparently finding Mill’s fear reasonable, the jury rejected murder charges and instead found him guilty of the lesser crime of voluntary manslaughter.

Consider also the trial of Josh Cottrell. Cottrell confessed to beating and strangling a gay man, stuffing his body into a suitcase, and then throwing the suitcase into a lake. Defense counsel argued that Cottrell had “the right to use deadly force” because the victim made a sexual advance. Although the jury was not sufficiently persuaded by the claim of self-defense, the jury was apparently persuaded by the claim of provocation, and it convicted the defendant of only the lesser charge of voluntary manslaughter.

Even more recently, in People v. Scarborough, a Michigan jury considered murder charges against twenty-one-year old Steven Willis Scarborough. Scarborough confessed to hitting his sixty-two-year old victim in the head with a baseball bat, knocking him unconscious, dragging the victim down a flight of stairs, stuffing the victim in the trunk of the victim’s car, and then driving the car away from the scene and abandoning the car. At trial, the defendant claimed the victim had knocked him out, and, when he awoke, the sixty-two-year old man was sexually assaulting him. Apparently believing this defense, the jury convicted Scarborough of the lesser charge of voluntary manslaughter.

In each of these cases, defendants on trial for harming or killing gay men have benefited by claiming they reasonably feared sexual assault, even when those claims seemed at odds with the facts before the jury. For example, in Schick v. Indiana, Schick’s subsequent actions—stealing the victim’s watch and

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148. Id.
150. Id.
152. Id. at *2; John Agar, Slaying Trial Leads from Trunk to Texas: FBI Picks up Murder Suspect: Credit Card Theft Also Charged, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Aug. 3, 2007, at A1.
154. Id.
155. Indeed, these cases suggest that the narrative of male-on-male rape is so taboo that it can obscure other aspects of the crime that would reveal the flaws in claims of self-defense or provocation.
cigarettes and taking care to wipe his fingerprints from the victim’s car—suggest a level of composure at odds with any claim that he was acting in the “heat of passion.” In Mills v. Shepard, the “gay panic” defense had even less support. Mills’s defense was that he was provoked into heat of passion when the victim made a sexual advance. In fact, Mills’s own confession included the admission that prior to the sexual advance, he had agreed to engage in sex with the victim in exchange for twenty dollars, had ridden with the victim to a secluded location to engage in sex, and that he attacked the victim, killing him, only after the victim stated that he did not have twenty dollars.

Even more troubling, defendants have also benefited from pretrial prosecutorial discretion to enter into plea deals that take into account defense claims of the fear of sexual assault. Consider a recent case from Washington, D.C. There, instead of pursuing the highest charge, prosecutors charged Robert Lee Hannah with voluntary manslaughter for killing a man outside a gay bar—apparently accepting the argument that he was provoked into beating to death Tony Randolph Hunter because Hunter “touched” him in a sexual way. Working from this already reduced charge of manslaughter, Hannah was able to further plead the case down to misdemeanor assault. By claiming that his actions were excused because he reasonably feared sexual assault, Hannah faced a maximum sentence of 180 days and a $1,000 fine.

As Cynthia Lee has observed, the “gay panic” defense is problematic in several respects. First, “such strategies are problematic because they reinforce and promote negative stereotypes about gay men as sexual deviants and sexual predators.” Second, allowance of the defense permits defendants to “capitalize on unconscious bias in favor of heterosexuality that is prevalent in today’s heterocentric society.” It legitimizes the notion that it is normatively right, or at least normatively excusable, to fear gay men, to view

156. Schick v. Indiana, 570 N.E.2d 918, 921.
158. Id. at 1233–34.
159. Prosecutors, of course, have almost unfettered discretion in deciding whether to charge a defendant, what charges to bring against a defendant, and what type of disposition to seek against a defendant. For cogent critiques of this power, see Angela Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13 (1988); Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717 (1996). Moreover, prosecutors often exercise this discretion based on passion—how much, or how little, a prosecutor cares about a case. For more on this phenomenon, see Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial Passion, Cognitive Bias, and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 183 (2007).
160. Dressler, When “Heterosexual” Men Kill, supra note 128, at 758 (observing that some prosecutors may offer defendants reduced pleas in response to claims of gay panic).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Lee, supra note 127, at 476.
165. Id.
166. Id.
gay and bisexual men as predators, and to respond to inchoate sexual advances not just with force, but deadly force.

To be sure, there are other problems with this defense that scholars have missed.167 And though scholars have proposed banning the “gay panic” defense,168 other alternatives exist.169 For the purposes of this Article, however, my larger concern is this dichotomy: at the same time that we talk about the threat of male-victim sexual assault in self-defense and provocation cases, we are silent about male-victim sexual assault in general. At the same time we tell ourselves that men cannot be raped, at least outside the prison context, we tell ourselves that it is reasonable for heterosexual men to fear same-sex rape and to respond with deadly force. In short, we have it both ways.170

B. Law Enforcement/Prosecutor “Trash” Talk

There is another instance where talk about male sexual victimization predominates: during the interrogation of suspects, defendants, and uncooperative witnesses. As demonstrated below, this talk is also unjust.

Imagine the police are investigating a gang-related drive-by shooting. The police know which gang is involved and even have an idea of which particular

167. The defense is also troubling because of the expressive message it sends. By liberally allowing defendants to assert the “gay panic” defense, courts and legislatures in fact legitimize the defense, sending the expressive message that fear of same-sex assault can be reasonable. In addition, it communicates the message that while homosexual conduct may be constitutionally protected under Lawrence v. Texas, such conduct should perhaps be kept closeted: men who are attracted to other men look and touch at their own peril.

168. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY 13–14 (2004); see also Mison, supra note 128.

169. One possible alternative, which I mention here only in broad strokes, would be to borrow from the act/status distinction that is at the foundation of criminal law. See generally Michael Moore, ACT AND CRIME (1993); Dressler, supra note 131, at 90–96. Provocation defenses predicated on “gay panic” should be allowed when the gravamen of the defense is that the defendant used force in response to something the victim did. However, the defense should be disallowed where the defendant’s response was primarily based on the victim’s status, rather than on the victim’s act. In this respect, a defendant’s claim that he was provoked into killing because he feared sexual assault when touched by a gay or bisexual man should be treated the same as a white defendant’s claim that he was provoked into killing because he feared contagion when touched by a black man. The court would thus disaggregate the act and the status to determine the merit of the defense. In short, absent threshold evidence objectively pointing to a substantial act by the victim to justify the defendant’s belief, neither claim should be permitted to go to the jury. A similar formulation could be used in jurisdictions that follow the MPC approach, notwithstanding the fact that the MPC eliminates the requirement of any provocative act. In a MPC jurisdiction, status would be disaggregated from factors used to consider the defendant’s “reasonable explanation or excuse.”

170. One way we hold these seemingly inconsistent views is by compartmentalizing our roles. As defense lawyers representing heterosexual men accused of harming gay or bisexual men, we play the “fear of rape” card. As scholars responding to such claims, we tend to dismiss them as meritless. As scholars discussing rape, we ignore the threat of male-victim rape outside of the prison context almost entirely. Meanwhile, jurors seem to accept the “fear of rape” card when heterosexual men invoke it as a defense but are arguably skeptical of the claim when invoked by male victims of rape.
gang member or members participated in the actual shooting. However, the police lack probable cause to make an arrest. To further their investigation, the police “invite” one of the gang members in for questioning. Because the suspect has not been charged, the police need not worry about appointing counsel. Likewise, because they intend to make it clear that the suspect is not under arrest, they need not worry about Miranda warnings, since technically the suspect is not in custody. The noncustodial interrogation will often include language like this:

_Shit up and listen! You got one chance to help yourself and tell us who the shooter is, or you’ll be the one in the big house touching your toes while Bubba and his friends make you their little bitch, you hear me?_173

While there is variation in how this is communicated, the underlying message is the same: don’t cooperate, and you will be fucked—literally. Crude, yes. Uncommon, no. Nor are these references to male rape limited to gang cases. Defense lawyers raise the specter of male rape in a narrow set of cases: cases where heterosexual men stand accused of harming gay men and where an assertion of “gay panic” might seem to bolster a self-defense or provocation defense. By contrast, prosecutors and law enforcement officers raise the specter of male rape in a broader range of cases. The specter of male rape is invoked in securities cases as casually as in drug distribution cases, in mail and wire fraud cases as casually as in racketeering cases. The prospect of a date with “Bubba” is leveled at poor defendants and wealthy defendants, minority defendants and nonminority defendants. In a way, the threat of male rape is the great equalizer, an “equal-opportunity” interrogation tool.176

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171. The Supreme Court has long read the Sixth Amendment as guaranteeing the right to counsel only if adversary judicial proceedings have commenced against the accused. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 432 (1986); United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180 (1984).

172. _Miranda_ warnings are required “only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him ‘in custody.’” Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977). Even where a suspect is the focus of an investigation, the police may interrogate the suspect without _Miranda_ warnings so long as a reasonable person in the suspect’s situation would have believed that he was not under arrest and was free to leave. Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 350 (1976). In practice, officers can advise suspects that they are not under arrest and are answering questions voluntarily in order to circumvent _Miranda_ warnings. RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 124–25 (2008).

173. I base this on hundreds of interviews I saw and participated in as a federal prosecutor. Similar statements appear in books about police interrogations. See, e.g., LEO, supra note 172, at 205 (describing an interview where the suspect was told he would be raped by a big black man if he did not cooperate).


175. I handled a variety of cases as a federal prosecutor, from drug prosecutions to
Such talk occurs so frequently that it is often taken as a given. But frequency does not equal legitimacy. Such talk should be both unacceptable and inconsistent with our notions of due process.\textsuperscript{177}

As far back as \textit{Brown v. Mississippi},\textsuperscript{178} a case involving three African Americans brutalized by sheriff’s deputies, the Court has interpreted the Due Process Clause to bar “[c]ompulsion by torture to extort a confession.”\textsuperscript{179} As the “use of overt physical violence [gave] way to the employment of more subtle kinds of pressure,”\textsuperscript{180} the Court extended \textit{Brown} to also bar the threat of force,\textsuperscript{181} such as holding a gun to a suspect’s head.\textsuperscript{182} The threat of force to secure a confession violates due process even where the confession is corroborated or is otherwise trustworthy.\textsuperscript{183} Due process is violated even if the threat is based on reality; even a threat to do what police have the discretionary authority to do may violate due process.\textsuperscript{184}

racketeering and securities fraud prosecutions, and saw this interrogation tool used in a wide array of cases.

\textsuperscript{176} The threat of rape, whether cast as a threat or an offer of protection, is also an assertion of masculinity. This remains true when the threat comes from the police or prosecutors. I am grateful to Frank Rudy Cooper for this observation and his work on police officers and masculinity. See, e.g., Frank Rudy Cooper, “Who’s the Man?: Masculinities Studies, Terry Stops and Police Training,” \textit{18 Colum. J. Gender & L.} 671 (2009).

\textsuperscript{177} Although the Supreme Court sought to avoid the indeterminacy of the involuntariness standard by adopting the prophylactic rule announced in \textit{Miranda v. Arizona}, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the voluntariness requirement retains vitality. Even where a defendant has knowingly waived his \textit{Miranda} rights, a statement may still be involuntary. As such, the voluntariness requirement exists independently of \textit{Miranda}. See LAFAYE ET AL., 2 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.1(c), at 607–08 (3d ed. 2007).

\textsuperscript{178} 297 U.S. 278 (1935). Two defendants were laid across chairs and whipped until their backs were “cut to pieces” and they had “confessed”; the third defendant was hung from a tree and whipped until he “confessed.” \textit{Id.} at 282.

\textsuperscript{179} \textit{Id.} at 285. Although \textit{Brown} and the Court’s subsequent coerced-confession cases turned on the use of the confessions at trial as triggering a due process violation, the Court has recently indicated that the coercion itself, apart from whether the resulting statement is introduced at trial, can also violate due process. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003). See also DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 445 (2002) (observing from a due process perspective, “two constitutional wrongs apparently exist: obtaining a confession by coercive police conduct, and using that confession at trial”); Arnold H. Loewy, \textit{Police-Obtained Evidence and the Constitution: Distinguishing Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence from Unconstitutionally Used Evidence}, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 907 (1987).


\textsuperscript{183} Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961) (ruling that convictions based on coerced confessions must be overturned “not because such confessions are unlikely to be true but because the methods used to extract them offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system”); Lisemba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1945) (stating that the due process voluntariness requirement is “to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true or false”); see also Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) (stating that the admission of ostensibly truthful confession obtained through use of truth serum violates due process).

\textsuperscript{184} In \textit{State v. Phelps}, for example, Nebraska’s highest court invalidated a confession made by a rape suspect in response to a warning that, absent an admission that intercourse
Given Brown and its progeny, a strong argument can be made that the threat of rape to induce a statement violates due process. Consider Arizona v. Fulminante.\textsuperscript{185} Fulminante was suspected of murdering his step-daughter and was incarcerated on other charges.\textsuperscript{186} A fellow inmate, acting as a police informant, befriended Fulminante and told him that other inmates did not look kindly on child-killers.\textsuperscript{187} The informant offered to protect Fulminante from harm if Fulminante told him the truth about the killing.\textsuperscript{188} Fulminante did.\textsuperscript{189} The Court, however, held that the invocation of harm and concomitant offer to protect from harm was sufficiently coercive to violate due process, requiring suppression of Fulminante’s confession.\textsuperscript{190}

Taken literally, Fulminante would suggest that due process is also violated when law enforcement officers and prosecutors use the indirect threat of male rape to obtain statements or induce pleas.\textsuperscript{191} In reality, it is unlikely that a defendant has ever made such a claim. Even Fulminante’s claim was based on the threat of physical harm absent protection from the police informant, not sexual harm.\textsuperscript{192} Such talk almost invariably remains under the radar, undisgressed, unchallenged, and unjust.\textsuperscript{193} This suggests that male-victim rape simultaneously can be a subject of unjust talk and unjust silence. During interrogation, law enforcement officers and prosecutors engage in unjust talk, whereas defense lawyers respond with unjust silence.

\textsuperscript{186} Id. at 282–83.
\textsuperscript{187} Id.
\textsuperscript{188} Id.
\textsuperscript{189} Id. at 283.
\textsuperscript{190} In so ruling, the Court analogized the case to its earlier decision in Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 564–67 (1958), in which an interrogating officer threatened to leave a suspect to an angry mob outside the jail unless he confessed.
\textsuperscript{191} The Court has long held that pleas must be voluntary and not the product of threats. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970) (“[T]he agents of the State may not produce a plea by actual or threatened physical harm or by mental coercions overbearing the will of the defendant.”). See also John Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (1978).
\textsuperscript{192} 499 U.S. at 288 (“[T]he Arizona Supreme Court found that it was fear of physical violence, absent protection from his friend (and Government agent) Sarivola, which motivated Fulminante to confess. Accepting the Arizona court’s finding, permissible on this record, that there was a credible threat of physical violence, we agree with its conclusion that Fulminante’s will was overborne in such a way as to render his confession the product of coercion.”).
\textsuperscript{193} I have uncovered only one case in which a reference to prison rape was brought into the open. In 2001, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the extradition request of the United States for four Canadian citizens wanted for defrauding Americans through a telemarketing scheme executed from Canada. Notwithstanding the fact that the United States had presented a prima facie case against the Canadians, the Court concluded that granting the extradition request would violate their rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights in light of statements made by the Assistant U.S. Attorney handling the case. That attorney had threatened, “You’re going to be the boyfriend of a very bad man if you wait out your extradition.” See Cobb v. United States, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 587 (Can.).
There is the larger issue, however. On one hand, defense lawyers talk about the specter of male rape to bolster claims of self-defense and provocation when heterosexual men harm gay men. On the other, prosecutors and law enforcement officers talk about male rape in their interrogation of suspects and defendants. So why have legal scholars been so silent on the issue of male-victim rape? And what might happen when we do talk about male sexual victimization?

III. UNJUST SILENCE

Notwithstanding its prevalence, actual male rape victimization has long been cloaked in silence. Part of this silence is traceable to the common law definition of rape. At common law, rape was understood to include four basic elements: (1) vaginal intercourse; (2) between a man and a woman who is not his wife; (3) achieved by force or a threat of severe bodily harm; and (4) without consent. Though jurists focused on the latter two elements, force and nonconsent, it is the first element that had the effect of not only gendering rape but also rendering male-victim rape invisible, or at least unarticulable.

In fact, all four elements, working in concert, had the effect of laying the foundation for a “rape script” against which all sexual encounters were to be judged. It was against this script that the “rape” of one’s wife was, as a matter of law, “not rape.” It was against this script that the “rape” of a teenage foster daughter, under threat of returning her to a juvenile detention facility, was, as a matter of law, “not rape.” And it was against this script that a defendant’s “rape” of his ex-girlfriend, committed shortly after, but not contemporaneous with, the threat to “fix” her face if she did not cooperate, was, as a matter of law, “not rape.”

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194. Blackstone defined rape as “carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and against her will.” 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *210. However, it was understood that a defendant could not be guilty of forcing his wife to engage in intercourse, even when such force was accompanied by physical violence. 1 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 628–29 (1778); see also DIANA H. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE (rev. ed. 1990); Jill Elaine Haskay, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1373 (2000). The rationales for the exception included the concept that the wife and husband were now legally merged into one person and that, by consenting to marriage, the wife had granted irrevocable consent to sexual intercourse with her husband.

195. As noted earlier, Sharon Marcus uses this term to refer to the typical script of a stranger-rape. See Marcus, supra note 97. It should be noted that the rape script can be understood as a product of, or a subset of, gender scripts that reward male aggression and female passivity. The literature on gender scripts is rich. One excellent discussion can be found in Mary Anne Case, “The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns”: Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law as Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447 (2000).


197. Commonwealth v. Milnarich, 542 A.2d 1335 (Pa. 1988) (reversing a rape conviction because threats to recommence the victim to foster care did not satisfy “force” element of rape
This rape script has been so enduring that even after the implementation of numerous reforms in the 1970s and 1980s, which eliminated the force requirement, reduced and eliminated proof on the victim’s part of physical resistance, and erected rape shield laws limiting inquiry, at trial, into a victim’s sexual history, decision makers still use the script as a yardstick. Police officers, prosecutors, jurors, and judges still use the script to determine, in the Rashomon-like world of he said/she said, on what side of the ticket their vote should go: rape or not rape.
This script has often rendered the “rape” of a man as “not rape.” This was true as a matter of law during the period when rape was defined with reference to gender,208 but it has also remained true even in the face of gender-neutral statutes.209 The effect has been a curious one, insofar as the existence of a female victim seems to have become not only a legal precondition but also a natural one, and one that is both descriptively accurate and empirically true. There has been another effect as well: because of this gendered script, we often fail to see male rape even in the face of overwhelming evidence of its existence, as the following three examples illustrate.210

Consider State v. Gounagias, a case from 1915.211 Gounagias, a Greek immigrant, had the misfortune to become so inebriated while celebrating Greek Easter with a fellow countryman that he lost consciousness.212 In the words of the opinion, while Gounagias was unconscious, his fellow countryman “committed upon him the unmentionable crime . . . leaving [Gounagias] in a state of semiconsciousness.”213 For three weeks, Gounagias was the subject of “laughing remarks and suggestive gestures” from other Greek immigrants.214 After three weeks, he armed himself, located the countryman who had committed the “outrage” upon him, and killed him.215 At trial, the court precluded Gounagias from arguing provocation or introducing evidence about the incident that triggered the shooting. The court’s decision was grounded upon the belief that Gounagias could not have acted in the “heat of passion” given the three-week delay between the offense and his response.216

_Gounagias_ appears in the Model Penal Code Commentaries217 and in several criminal law casebooks218 to illustrate the “heat of passion” requirement of law enforcement officers and prosecutors to proceed with such cases.

208. This is not to suggest that male-victim rape always went unpunished. Rather, these crimes, when prosecuted, were treated as crimes of sodomy, not rape, simply because of the gender of the victim. See 3 WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 289 (Charles E. Torcia ed., 15th ed., 1995); see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY LAWS IN AMERICA 1860–2003, at 20 (2008).

209. Even now, prosecutors occasionally charge male-victim rape as forced sodomy, even when gender-neutral rape statutes are available. In addition, while most states now have gender-neutral rape statutes, it should be noted that statutory rape statutes remain very much gender-dependent, a practice the Supreme Court upheld in Michael M. _v._ Sonoma County 450 U.S. 464 (1981).

210. In prior work, I have engaged in a practice I identify as “reading black” to read judicial opinions that are ostensibly race-free to reveal a racialized subtext. See I. Bennett Capers, _Reading Back, Reading Black_, 35 Hofstra L. Rev. 9 (2006). What I am doing here is similar in some respects, but along an axis of sexuality rather than race.

211. 153 P. 9 (Wash. 1915).
212. _Id._ at 10.
213. _Id._
214. _Id._
215. _Id._
216. _Id._ at 14.
217. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 210.3.
218. _See_, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, CRIMINAL LAW 270 (5th ed. 2009); MARKUS D.
in the provocation defense. But the case is also interesting for another reason. The case illustrates how the law often participates in the erasure of male-victim rape. Indeed, in *Gounagias*, this erasure happened at least three times. As an initial matter, the law participated in the erasure of Gounagias’s victimization by defining rape with reference to gender, thus rendering the crime against Gounagias as “not rape.”219 Next, the trial court participated in this erasure by precluding the defense from introducing evidence about the sexual victimization, rendering male-victim rape invisible to the jury.220 Lastly, the appellate court, in affirming the decision, committed an act of erasure. Notwithstanding the fact that the very issue before the court was whether Gounagias’s victimization amounted to legally adequate provocation, the word “rape” does not appear in the opinion. The “unmentionable crime”221 and the “outrage committed by the deceased”222 refer not to the crime of rape, but to the crime of sodomy, which also remains unnamed.223 Indeed, a strong argument can be made that the *Gounagias* case illustrates a fourth level of male-victim rape erasure. The case appears in criminal casebooks to illustrate the operation of the provocation defense.224 It does not appear in criminal casebooks to illustrate the operation, or nonoperation, of the law of rape. Indeed, to the extent male-victim rape is made explicit at all in casebooks, it is usually in the “defenses” section and in context of prison escape cases such as *United States v. Bailey*225 or *People v. Lovercamp*,226 in which courts

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219. At the time, Washington State defined rape to require a “female not the wife of the perpetrator.” See, e.g., *State v. Powers*, 277 P. 373 (Wash. 1929).
221. *Id.* at 10.
222. *Id.* at 13.
223. Indeed, the failure to name male-victim rape as rape is part of a long history of erasing same-sex intimacy. For an interesting discussion of gay sexuality and naming, see Courtney Megan Cahill, *Still* Not Fit to Be Named: Moving Beyond Race to Explain Why ‘Separate’ Nomenclature for Gay and Straight Relationships Will Never Be ‘Equal,’ 97 GEO. L.J. 1155 (2009).
224. See *Gounagias*, 153 P. at 10–11.
225. 444 U.S. 394 (1980) (denying defense where prisoner-escapees did not attempt to surrender to authorities after escaping intolerable prison conditions, notwithstanding evidence that the abusers included the prison guards and that one of the escapees attempted to surrender, but first wanted assurances that he would not be returned to the same facility). In his dissent, Justice Blackmun laid bare the reality of prison life, noting the complaints courts receive daily about the conditions of incarceration, including the prevalence of prison rape, such that the “atrocities and inhuman conditions of prison life in America are almost unbelievable.” *Id.* at 421 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun noted:

A youthful inmate can expect to be subjected to homosexual gang rape his first night in jail, or, it has been said, even in the van on the way to jail. Weaker inmates become the property of stronger prisoners or gangs, who sell the sexual services of the victim. Prison officials are either disinterested in stopping abuse of prisoners by other prisoners, or are incapable of doing so given the limited resources society allocates to
acknowledge the pervasiveness of prison rape yet deny defendants either a duress or necessity defense when they attempt to escape such conditions.\textsuperscript{227}

The rape script, a product of the common law’s gendered definition of rape and its emphasis on penetration,\textsuperscript{228} has been so powerful that it has blinded us to rape or sexual assault in one of the most horrendous categories of crimes of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Between 1889 and 1918 alone, white mobs lynched on average more than a hundred blacks a year, and this extralegal violence was often accompanied by castration.\textsuperscript{229} Even though these lynchings were often in response to perceived sexual crimes against white women and even though the punishment involved the male sexual organ, we have yet to fully recognize that the response—castration—was at its core a sexual crime, a punishment grounded in notions of “just deserts” and \textit{lex talionis}, and a type of “communal rape.”\textsuperscript{230}

Finally, consider again the Haitian immigrant Abner Louima, whom Officer Justin Volpe sodomized with a broken broomstick in 1997.\textsuperscript{231} Were
Louima female, we would readily recognize the crime as rape. Because the victim was male, however, we have trouble recognizing the crime as sexual at all. Again, sexual assault becomes “not sexual assault.” Rape becomes “not rape.”

It is one thing to note that rape scripts have contributed to rendering male sexual victimization invisible and unspeakable, but my larger concern is that too many of us have acquiesced in this invisibility—or worse, contributed to it.  

The role played by feminist scholars in this invisibility is especially troubling. As noted earlier, Susan Estrich, in her oft-cited Real Rape, reduces male-victim rape to a footnote.  

But she is not alone. In a footnote, Michelle Anderson acknowledges male victimization, but declines to address it on the ground that “ninety-nine out of 100 convicted rapists are male and rape victims are overwhelmingly female.” Having elsewhere written about underreporting by female rape victims, Anderson fails to consider the even greater likelihood of underreporting by male victims. Ann Cahill, who writes extensively about rape, similarly sidesteps male victims:

I will regularly refer to assailants as male, and victims as female. . . . That members of all sexes are theoretical candidates for either role does not justify treating the phenomenon as a sex- or gender-neutral one. The vast majority of the victims are women. To ignore this disproportionality (which, of course, I do not view as natural or biologically necessary) is to misunderstand the phenomenon at the outset.  

Other feminists likewise relegate male sexual victimization to a footnote, or fail to address it at all. I, too, have been guilty of this omission.

This relegation of male-victim sexual assault to the margins is also reflected in feminist responses to actual rape. For example, when the 1989 rape of a female Central Park jogger drew national attention, the outrage expressed

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232. Part of this has to do with the belief that male-victim rape occurs almost exclusively in prisons populated with “bad” men getting their “just deserts.” They are also disproportionately populated with black, brown, and poor men, adding to our indifference.

233. Estrich, supra note 33, at 6 n.8.


237. See, e.g., Hasday, supra note 194, at 1494 n.444; Aviva Orenstein, Special Issues Raised by Rape Trials, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1585 n.2 (2007); Cory Rayburn, To Catch a Sex Thief: The Burden of Performance in Rape and Sexual Assault Trials, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 437 n.3 (2006).


by feminist groups was deafening. 240. By contrast, feminist organizations responded to the rape of Abner Louima with silence. For organizations that claim to care about gender equality, this silence is troubling.

Aside from a few exceptions,241 queer scholars have also acquiesced in the silence around male sexual victimization. 242 For example, Bill Eskridge’s influential GayLaw includes a discussion of male-perpetrator/female-victim rape, but makes no mention of male-victim rape. 243 The leading casebook on sexuality and the law, Sexuality, Gender, and the Law, similarly discusses female-victim rape but not male-victim rape. 244 Other queer law books repeat this omission. 245

Legal scholars who write about the plight of black men in our criminal justice system have also been unjustifiably silent. Consider, for example, Marc Mauer’s Race to Incarcerate246 or Michelle Alexander’s The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness. 247 The books are deservedly heralded, but they are also silent on the issue of rape in prison. If male-victim rape occurs most frequently in prisons and if black men are disproportionately represented in prisons, then there should be some discussion not only about the

240. As one commentator put it:
In 1989, [the National Organization for Women] made the jogger into a symbol of violence against women. Feminists were some of the loudest voices in the swelling chorus of public opinion calling on New York’s law enforcement community to find the culprits as swiftly as possible—and were credulous when the confessions came in. Christine Stolbe, Big Sister Wants Your DNA, NAT’L REVIEW, Dec. 11, 2002, available at http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-stolba121102.asp.


242. This is not to “homosexualize” male-victim rape. Again, most of the perpetrators of male-victim rape identify as heterosexual. Similarly, many of the victims are heterosexual. However, some perpetrators are gay, and, more significantly, many male rape victims are gay or bisexual. Just as date rape occurs among heterosexuals, it occurs among gay men. In the prison context, the men most at risk of being raped tend to be gays and bisexuals. For example, in at least one study, 18.5 percent of gay inmates reported being sexually victimized in prison, compared to 9.8 percent for bisexual or sexually “other” inmates, and 2.7 percent for inmates who identified as heterosexual. See DOJ Statistics Special Report, Sexual Victimization in Local Jails Reported by Inmates, 2007 (June 2008), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=1148. For a provocative critique of California’s “protective” segregation of gay inmates, see Russell K. Robinson, supra note 31.


244. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW (2003). Again, this silence may be attributable to the belief that victims of male rape tend to be incarcerated men who are mostly brown or black and thus outside the purview of “model homo families,” a term I borrow from Katherine Franke. See Katherine M. Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 236, 239 (2006).


246. MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE (2006).

mass incarceration of black men in this country but also about the sexual punishments collateral to black men.

Lastly, criminal law scholars in general have ignored male-victim rape. For starters, criminal law casebooks and scholars ignore male sexual victimization in their discussions of the rationales for punishment. If retribution requires that the punishment be proportional to the crime and the defendant’s blameworthiness, then some discussion is necessary of the “sexual punishments” that are often a collateral consequence of our penal system. If deterrence is predicated on notice, as it must be, then penologists are hindering that goal when they cloak sexual punishments in silence.

All of these scholars no doubt have reasons for not discussing male sexual victimization. For feminist scholars, to acknowledge male sexual victimization would require a reanalysis of many assumptions. It would call into question Catharine MacKinnon’s claim that rape is always a mechanism for the male domination of women. It would call into question Susan Brownmiller’s assertion that rape is “nothing more or less than a conscious process of intimidation by which all men keep all women in a state of fear.” It would be to admit that women do not have a monopoly on sexual victimization, and it would call into question other efforts to gender crime, such as feminists’ continuing role in the implementation of the Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”) and internationally in the implementation of the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”).

Admitting the existence of male sexual victimization would require other groups to readjust their thinking. For queer scholars, there may be the concern that opponents of gay rights will use any discussion of male-victim rape as an opening to (re)cast gay men as sexual predators, notwithstanding the fact that most male perpetrators of male-victim rape identify as heterosexual. For example, in his testimony before Congress, General Norman Schwarzkopf used the specter of gay soldiers sexually assaulting heterosexual soldiers as an argument against allowing gay men to serve in the military. In response to a

248. I borrow this term from Alice Ristroph. See Ristroph, supra note 31.

249. I focus here on legal scholars, but the same questions can be asked of other groups. For example, one could ask why men have been silent about male-victim rape. Or, as Russell Robinson put it to me, “Why are men so committed to masculinity ideals that they erase men who are victimized?” I am indebted to Robinson for raising this point.


253. For the argument that gender needs to be removed from CEDAW, see Darren Rosenblum, Rethinking International Women’s Human Rights Through Eve Sedgwick, 33 Harv. J.L. & Gender 349 (2010).

254. See supra note 59.

255. In his testimony before Congress, General Schwarzkopf invoked the trope of
vote in the U.S. House of Representatives to repeal Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,\(^{256}\) this argument was made again.\(^{257}\) For legal scholars who write about the plight of black men in the criminal justice system, there is the uncomfortable problem that rape itself is perceived to be, however incorrectly, racialized in prisons, with black men more likely to be victimizers and white men more likely to be victims.\(^{258}\) Finally, for criminal law scholars, especially penologists, to acknowledge the prevalence of male sexual victimization in the prison system, especially to the extent that sexual victimization is perceived to be racialized, would require a radical rethinking of our system of punishments and how sentences should be calibrated.\(^{259}\) Again, many groups that should be concerned about male-victim rape have been silent. Just to be clear, my objective here is not only to be critical but also to extend an invitation. Quite simply, it is time for more of us to work together to combat rape.

homosexual predator: “I am aware of instances where heterosexuals have been solicited to commit homosexual acts, and even more traumatic emotionally, physically coerced to engage in such acts.” See Policy Concerning Homosexuality in the Armed Forces, Hearing Held by Senate Armed Services Committee, 103rd Cong. 593 (1994).


257. See, e.g., Kenneth Harvey, FRC: DADT Repeal Will Increase Gay Rape, ADVOCATE.COM (May 27, 2010, 5:00 PM), http://www.advocate.com//News/Daily_News/2010/05/27/FRC_DADT_Repeal_Will_Increase_Gay_Rape (reporting Family Research Council’s claim that same-sex sexual assault “would skyrocket” if gays are allowed in the military).

258. See, e.g., Man & Cronan, supra note 77, at 158–64; Peter L. Nacci & Thomas R. Kane, Inmate Sexual Aggression: Some Evolving Propositions, Empirical Findings, and Mitigating Counter-Forces, 9 J. OFFENDER COUNSELING, SERVICES, & REHABILITATION 1, 7 (1985). For example, according to data collected by the Department of Justice, in 2006 whites made up 72 percent of the prison rape victims, blacks 16 percent, and Hispanics 9 percent. In terms of perpetrators, 49 percent of the perpetrators were identified as black. ALLEN J. BECK ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SEXUAL VIOLENCE REPORTED BY CORRECTIONAL AUTHORITIES 2006, at 4 (2007). Whether these numbers accurately reflect the racial make-up of victims and perpetrators is contested. For example, there is anecdotal evidence that prison officials are less likely to credit black rape victims than those who are white. For a sustained critique of the black-perpetrator/white-victim prison narrative and an overview of recent surveys that debunk the narrative, see Buchanan, supra note 31.

IV.
RETHINKING RAPE

What has motivated this project, at least on one level, is the concern that male-victim rape has been relegated to the footnotes for too long. Despite its frequency, male sexual victimization remains cloaked in silence. To be sure, there has been increased attention paid to prison rape in recent years, in part due to the passage of the Prison Rape Elimination Act in 2003.\footnote{42 U.S.C. §§ 15601–09 (2006).} This attention is miniscule, however, compared to the attention given to the rape of women, and there has been almost no talk of adult male sexual victimization outside the prison context. Indeed, to the extent male sexual victimization outside the prison context is discussed at all, it is outside of legal discourse, and it is usually in the context of unjust talk—talk grounded in the stereotype of gay men as sexual predators used to bolster a self-defense or provocation defense or in “trash talk” by police officers and prosecutors to secure cooperation from suspects and defendants.

With that said, de-marginalizing male-victim rape is only one motivation for this Article. Another driving force has been a series of questions. These questions are the foundation for the normative part of this Article. What happens to rape talk when we broaden the discussion to include male sexual victimization? What happens to the law of rape when we reconceive rape so that it is no longer just a crime men perpetrate against women but rather a crime one person persecrizes against another? What happens when we unthink gender and reconceptualize rape as a nongendered crime?\footnote{I am not the first to ask such questions. Attorney Patricia Novotny asked similar questions several years ago, but she focused on the risks in de-gendering rape, such as “male co-option of the victim category.” See Patricia Novotny, Rape Victims in the (Gender) Neutral Zone: The Assimilation of Resistance, 1 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUSTICE 743, 745 (2003). As this Article hopefully demonstrates, these putative risks pale in comparison to the actual harm suffered by male victims of rape. These actual harms will continue so long as male-victim rape goes unacknowledged, remains sidelined, footnoted, or treated as “separate” from “real rape.” Another counter-argument is that even when men rape men, the crime is still gendered because the victim is feminized. Focusing on prisons, one could point to the fact that male rapists often force their male victims to adopt female names and mannerisms. But just because the perpetrator may engage in binary thinking does not mean that we should. When a man rapes another man, it is not simulated male-female rape. It is rape. Even if de-gendering rape goes too far for some, rethinking gender and rape can at least help us better understand how gender subordination and compulsory masculinity occur among men. For more on this dynamic, see Angela Harris, Gender, Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 777 (2000).} What are the benefits? What are the drawbacks? What are the risks? What are the rewards?

I am convinced that these are questions that deserve colloquy, not soliloquy. What I hope is that this Article can function as a catalyst for a conversation that is long overdue and much needed. Put simply, more attention must be paid to male sexual victimization. This is true of male victimization
outside of prisons, where rape is as hidden as female-victim rape was fifty years ago, and it is true of male sexual victimization in prisons—those zones of underenforcement. Feminists have long made the point that no one asks to be raped, that no one deserves to be raped. Indeed, feminists have been so successful in pressing this point that we have seen a shift in attitudes about rape in recent years.\footnote{262. See, e.g., Jeannie Suk, “The Look in His Eyes”: State v. Rusk and Rape Reform, in CRIMINAL LAW STORIES (Robert Weisberg & Donna Coker eds., 2010) (“Starting in the 1970s, under the influence of feminism, social attitudes [about permissible sexual behavior and rape] changed significantly.”), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1546602; Anthony C. Thompson, What Happens Behind Locked Doors: The Difficulty of Addressing and Eliminating Rape in Prison, NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 119, 120–21 (2009) (observing that “as a result of campaigns by the women’s movement in the 1960s . . . American society’s perception of, and attitudes toward, rape and domestic violence underwent a seismic shift.”).} To put it colloquially, we get it: rape is rape, at least when it comes to female victims. What is overdue is an attitudinal shift with respect to all victims. If no one asks to be raped and if no one deserves to be raped, then that applies to men too, including male prisoners, regardless of their crime.

To be sure, there are issues beyond recognizing that sexual assault is a nongendered crime, or strengthening PREA, or rewriting the gender-specific rape statutes that continue to exist in several jurisdictions.\footnote{263. See supra note 44.} There is also the issue of more egalitarian, gender-neutral policing and prosecutions. But that is only the start. If we are going to talk openly and honestly about male sexual victimization, then we must be honest and open about the fact that, notwithstanding the Court’s claim that sexual abuse is “not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society,”\footnote{264. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 857 (1994).} our carceral punishments \textit{are} sexual punishments. And we must be honest and open about the extent to which rape laws, even those laws resulting from feminist reforms in the 1970s, do a disservice not only to male victims of rape but to all victims of rape. All of these points warrant discussion. To begin the conversation, I address three of these issues below.

\textit{A. Egalitarian Policing}

Despite the fact that male sexual victimization occurs with alarming frequency, both in and outside of prisons, such sexual assaults are almost never prosecuted.\footnote{265. See supra note 70.} To law enforcement officers and prosecutors, such rapes fail to follow the script of “real rape,” which requires a female victim. Accordingly, they are too often dismissed as “not rape.”\footnote{266. See supra notes 208–10 and accompanying text.} Even when perpetrated by strangers and accompanied by violence, decision makers dismiss male-victim rape as “unfounded” and “unsubstantiated” and dismiss real victims as homosexual nonvictims.\footnote{267. See Rumney, \textit{supra} note 93.}
All of this has consequences that go beyond the male victim. The paucity of prosecutions reifies the closet, perpetuates the stigma of male-victim rape, and sends the expressive message that some crimes, because of the sex of the victims, are best kept behind closed doors. This, in turn, facilitates a cycle of male victims being unwilling to come forward. It also communicates the fiction that male-victim rape does not happen. If it happened, there would be prosecutions. Because there are no prosecutions, it does not happen. In short, even though most rape statutes have been amended so that their language is gender neutral, our prosecutions continue to be over-determined by gender.

Here, my proposal for addressing this lack of gender neutrality in prosecutions is simple. Indeed, it is on par with efforts feminists took to bring attention to domestic violence and date rape in the 1970s. First, we must continue to bring attention to male sexual victimization. This includes the victimization that occurs in prisons as well as the victimization that occurs outside of prisons. Second, we must press law enforcement agencies and district attorneys to collect and analyze sexual assault data with attention to the gender of complainants, similar to the collection many agencies already do with respect to race. Such data collection alone is likely to have effects. For example, research has shown that the process of making a factor salient can cause decision makers to become aware of implicit biases and thus allows them to override those biases. Third, we must demand an expectation of gender-neutrality in sexual assault prosecutions. This includes sexual assaults that occur both inside as well as outside of prisons.

Some of this can be accomplished through better training. At least one study has found that the police are significantly more likely to treat as unfounded a sexual assault complaint made by a male than by a female. This is unacceptable, especially when evidence suggests change is possible through education and leadership. Some of this can also be accomplished by insisting


269. Using implicit association tests (IATs), which measure the speed at which an individual associates a categorical status with a characteristic, social cognition researchers have shown that implicit biases continue to be widespread. Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup Favoritism, Outgroup Favoritism, and Their Behavioral Manifestations, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 143, 146 (2004). As Linda Krieger has noted, “even the well-intentioned will inexcorably categorize along racial, gender, and ethnic lines.” Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1217 (1995).

270. Research has also shown that making individuals aware of their biases facilitates the process of overriding those biases. See Dasgupta, supra note 269, at 157.

271. See Rumney, supra note 93.

272. While studies are far from conclusive, there is certainly evidence to suggest police norms can be modified through training and example. See, e.g., JANET B.L. CHAN, CHANGING
that decision makers at every level—from police officers to prosecutors to juries—engage in switching exercises. As I have suggested elsewhere, imagining what decision would be appropriate for a female victim can aid decision makers in confronting and overriding implicit biases they may have when dealing with a male victim. Similarly, imagining what decision would be appropriate for a nonincarcerated victim can aid a decision maker in overriding biases against incarcerated victims.

One can imagine two probable negative responses to this proposal. The first response would be that male rape victims are often unwilling to pursue criminal prosecutions because of the stigma associated with male sexual victimization. The second is that jurors, as ultimate arbiters of guilt, are unlikely to convict male-on-male rapists. While these are legitimate concerns, neither is sufficient to justify the status quo.

One reason why male victims are often unwilling to pursue criminal prosecutions is because they anticipate the unwillingness of law enforcement officers and prosecutors to take their cases seriously. One way to break this cycle is to make a point of prosecuting cases involving male victims of sexual assault. With respect to the concern that jurors will not convict, my response is threefold. First, this concern ignores the fact that about 83 percent of rape prosecutions are disposed of by pleas. Second, while it may be difficult to secure convictions in some cases, this alone should not be a ground for foregoing a prosecution. The role of the prosecutor is to ensure that justice is done, and this means bringing cases to trial even when conviction is less than guaranteed. Third, this concern ignores the role the criminal law and

POLICE CULTURE: POLICING IN A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY (1997).


274. Capers, Cross Dressing and the Criminal, supra note 273, at 24–26 (discussing benefits of “cross gender dressing” in cases involving sexual assault allegations). Kim Buchanan has recently argued that decision makers allow many prison rapists something akin to a “heterosexual defense.” These decision makers tolerate, and even reward, sexually aggressive behavior as a way of enforcing norms of masculinity; at the same time, these decision makers often refuse protection to male victims who fail to meet norms of masculinity insofar as they are unable to “man up” and defend themselves. See Buchanan, supra note 31. My “cross gender dressing” approach would also address this problem.

275. Just Detention International (“JDI”) seeks to enlist the public in its crusade against prison rape using a similar “cross dressing” strategy. Its advertising campaign shows images of an identical man. Under the first image is the caption, “Would You Joke Around About This Man Being Raped?” Under the second image, in which the identical man is now in prison garb, the caption asks, “How About Now?” The ad campaign is available at http://www.justdetention.org.

276. See Smith, Prosecuting Sexual Violence, supra note 70, at 20.


278. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (observing that the prosecutor’s
prosecutors can play in shifting or, to borrow from Dan Kahan, “gently nud[ingen]" prevailing norms. 279 Prosecuting male-victim rape communicates that male-victim rape happens, but it also shifts public expectations. Part I of this Article cited damning statistics about the prevalence of male-victim sexual assault. Indeed, I made the observation that the numbers are the argument. But the numbers are damming on the prosecution side, too. Men are being raped every day, yet the number of rape cases that are prosecuted is minuscule. Here, too, the numbers speak for themselves. The first task, then, is to secure gender-neutral policing and gender-neutral prosecutions.

B. Rethinking Sentencing

An honest and open discussion about the prevalence of male-victim sexual assault in the prison system also requires us to rethink our systems of punishment. In short, it is time for judges to consider the reality of prison rape in sentencing.

Judges rarely acknowledge sexual victimization in prison when imposing sentences,280 but the fact is that judges, for the most part, have the authority to

interest is “that justice shall be done”); see also ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.9 (3d ed. 1993) (stating a prosecutor should not be deterred from prosecuting cases simply because jurors in his jurisdiction have tended to acquit persons accused of the particular criminal act). Specific steps prosecutors can take to minimize the risk of acquittal include voir dire questions that screen for gender bias that are similar to the instruction that already exists with respect to race. See, e.g., 1 LEONARD B. SAND ET AL., MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CRIMINAL ¶ 2.01 (Instruction 2-8).


280. There are a few exceptions. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 945 F.2d 525 (2d Cir. 1991) (affirming sentencing departure for defendant because of the “feminine cast to his face and a softness of features which [would] make him prey to long-term criminals with whom he [would be] associated in prison”); United States v. Lara, 905 F.2d 599, 603 (2d Cir. 1990) (affirming departure from sentencing guidelines for “delicate looking young man” based on defendant’s vulnerability to sexual attack in prison); United States v. Blarek, 7 F. Supp. 2d 192 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (granting a departure to defendants who were “homosexual lovers” and whose “sexual proclivity” would be well known to fellow inmates and increase their vulnerability in prison); United States v. Ruff, 998 F. Supp. 1351 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (granting departure to gay defendant with “somewhat effeminate mannerisms” because of his heightened vulnerability to sexual abuse); People v. Insignares, 470 N.Y.S.2d 513 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (granting a sentence reduction to defendant who was raped by five other inmates while awaiting sentencing). These exceptions are noteworthy for being so few. This is not to suggest that judges invariably ignore sexual vulnerability. Rather, courts tend to “surreptitiously calibrate sentences” based on their expectations of how particular defendants will experience prison. See Adam J. Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 182, 194–95 (2009). Indeed, one of my concerns is that such surreptitious sentencing is influenced by implicit biases about race and class. For example, interviews with judges suggest that many judges believe white-collar defendants experience incarceration differently than other defendants and take this into account in imposing sentence. See STANTON WHEELER ET AL., SITTING IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF WHITE COLLAR CRIMINALS 144–50 (1988). One advantage of my proposal is that it would bring
consider this kind of information. While the authority to fashion an appropriate sentence is not without constraints in general, these constraints are not insurmountable. For example, in the federal system, a judge may consider the likelihood of a defendant being abused while in prison in fashioning an appropriate sentence. In addition, judges have traditionally considered sentencing rationales in imposing sentences: incapacitation of the criminal, rehabilitation of the offender, deterrence to the defendant and others, and just desert for the crime committed.

Focusing on deterrence, judges could consider likely sexual victimization in determining what type and length of sentence is necessary to deter the defendant from committing further crimes. In other words, the threat of “sexual punishments” should play a factor in gauging any deterrent effect. Similarly, focusing on retribution, judges could factor in likely sexual victimization in determining “just deserts.” For example, sentencing guidelines may recommend a sentence of twelve to eighteen months for a defendant found guilty of tax evasion, but this sentence may only be appropriate if punishment is viewed in the abstract. If a likely collateral consequence of imprisonment is rape, or even the fear of rape, some lesser sentence may be retributively appropriate.

One can imagine the counterarguments, namely that this proposal would lead to uncertainty in sentencing and would vest too much discretion in judges. These counterarguments are not without merit. Part of the reason that Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984—which resulted in the United States Sentencing Guidelines to govern federal sentences—was to address

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281. Even though the Sentencing Guidelines discourage federal courts from considering a defendant’s youth, physical condition, or appearance in determining whether or not to grant a sentencing departure, U.S.S.G. § 5H1.1, the Guidelines allow courts some leeway to consider such factors in unusual circumstances. Furthermore, even these constraints have lost much of their force. In United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court held that requiring judges to adhere to the Sentencing Guidelines would violate the Constitution. 543 U.S. 220, 232–37 (2005). More recently, the Court held that any review of judicial sentences that required judges to adhere to the Guidelines would also raise constitutional concerns. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 45 (2007).

282. For example, in Koon v. United States, which involved the officers in the Rodney King beating, the Court affirmed a departure under the Sentencing Guidelines based upon “susceptibility to abuse in prison.” 518 U.S. 81, 111–12 (1996).


284. Of course, it is likely that judges already take the likelihood of sexual victimization into account but do so under the radar, outside of the record. This likely further skews the racial disparity that exists in sentencing, a point I take up infra notes 301–04 and accompanying text.

285. See Kolber, supra note 280 (arguing that any successful justification of punishment must recognize that how punishment is experienced matters to the proper assessment of its severity). Although Kolber focuses on purely subjective variations in how punishment is experienced, such as claustrophobia, he makes clear that his claims apply equally to objective differences in prisoners’ experiences, such as sexual assault victimization. Id. at 188–89.
disparity, including racial disparity, in the imposition of sentences. Here, given the common misperception that vulnerability to sexual victimization is connected to race, my proposal could even exacerbate the problem of racially disparate sentences rather than reduce the problem. Again, all of these are valid concerns. For many, these concerns are enough to end the discussion.

But consider the short-term and long-term salutary benefits. In the short term, calibrating sentences based on the likelihood of sexual assault accords with how we as a society justify punishment. As Adam Kolber recently observed, retributivists justify punishment with the claim that offenders deserve to suffer for their crimes but with the caveat that the offender’s suffering must be proportionate to his offense. As a matter of internal logic, this means that taking account of the differences in the punishment experiences of people—which differences include sexual victimization—is in fact consistent with retributivism. Indeed, such sentencing calibration is necessary to retributivism’s coherency. To put it bluntly, a defendant convicted of drug possession might deserve two years’ incarceration for his offense, but his punishment is not proportionate to his offense if those two years include being raped four times. Retributivism, if it is to be internally consistent, would suggest that this difference matters and must be taken into account. The same is true if one seeks a consequentialist justification of punishment. As Kolber reminds us, such calibration accords with Jeremy Bentham, who wrote:

[O]wing to the different manners and degrees in which persons under different circumstances are affected by the same exciting cause, a punishment which is the same in name will not always either really produce, or even so much as appear to others to produce, in two different persons the same degree of pain.

For example, a sentence of two years’ imprisonment may be sufficient to deter John Smith from violating the narcotics laws. To the extent we can predict that

286. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 5H1.10 (policy statement) (1992). This is not to suggest that the Guidelines have been successful in this regard. See, e.g., Meierhofer, supra note 259, at 388 (concluding that “Race, or factors related to race but not controlled for by this analysis, is a more important factor in sentencing now than it was before.”); Mustard, supra note 259, at 285 (similar).

287. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A, at 2 (2010) (observing that one of Congress’s prime objectives was to obtain reasonable uniformity in sentencing by eliminating the wide disparity in sentencing imposed for similar conduct committed by similar offenders).

288. See Buchanan, supra note 31. In fact, Brenda Smith suggests that one factor that prompted the passage of the Prison Rape Elimination Act was the increase in persons in custody, “in particular, white men,” and the resulting public concern for their safety. See Smith, The Prison Rape Elimination Act, supra note 75, at 10.


290. Id. at 104.

his sentence will also involve being raped, his punishment can no longer be justified as a matter of consequentialism, since it involves an overdeterrent.

My real interest, though, is in the long-term consequences of this proposal. In other words, my aim is true consequentialism that looks to benefit society as a whole. A rash of sentencing departures based on the probability of prison rape may lead to a legislatively-imposed curtailment of sentencing discretion. But given the basis for these departures—the pervasiveness of prison rape—and the public’s likely response, it is more probable that legislatures will respond by requiring prison officials to make prisons safer. Indeed, one of the most significant findings of the most recent National Prison Rape Elimination Commission Report is that sexual abuse is not an inevitable feature of incarceration.292 Prisons can be made safe from sexual violence. For example, according to recent statistics collected by the Department of Justice, ten facilities reported rates of sexual victimization of 9.3 percent or greater during a one-year period.293 During the same period, six facilities reported no incidents of sexual victimization at all.294 This suggests that reduced sentences from judges could lead to legislative action which might in turn pressure prison officials to make their penal facilities safer.

The concern that my proposal would exacerbate racial disparities in sentencing gives me the most pause, especially given my work on combating racial injustice in the criminal justice system.295 Due to the fact that judges are likely, however wrongly,296 to perceive the risk of sexual victimization to be greater for white defendants than for black or Hispanic defendants, there is a real risk that we could see a further skewing of sentences along racial lines. This risk, however, is not insurmountable. It can be addressed and minimized. By keeping track of sentencing departures and race, we can sensitize judges to possible implicit biases so that they can override those biases. Asking judges to engage in race-switching exercises, as I have advocated elsewhere, should also reduce biases.297 Finally, unclamping male-victim rape in prisons to reveal its pervasiveness and to disabuse judges of racialized assumptions about its perpetrators and victims can reduce the risk of exacerbating racial disparities in sentencing.

There is another reason that a frank and open discussion about prison rape compels our rethinking the prison system. One consequence of prison rape is

294. Id. It is entirely possible that numbers are exaggerated on both ends, but it is also possible that some facilities are safer than others.
295. See, e.g., I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43 (2009); I. Bennett Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizenship, and the Equality Principle, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2011); Capers, The Unintentional Rapist, supra note 239.
296. See Buchanan, supra note 31.
297. See Capers, Cross Dressing and the Criminal, supra note 273, at 22–30.
increased risk of HIV infection, which upon reentry into the general population leads to increased HIV infection rates in the general population. As Dorothy Roberts has observed, this has its own social and moral costs.

Lastly, there is the entirely utilitarian concern about rape’s effects. For the most part, we have given up on rehabilitating prisoners, in part because recidivism rates appear to belie the claimed effectiveness of correctional rehabilitation. But in a society that cares about the Benthamite notion of ensuring the greater good of society, we should be concerned with what it means to readmit into society individuals whom we have sentenced to lawless zones, zones where their sexual victimization, either through actual rape or fear of rape, is almost certain. In sentencing defendants to prison, we are incarcerating men who violated our criminal laws. But questions need be asked: what type of man exits prison? What does prison teach men about sex? And how is his resocialization, and in turn our society, shaped by his experience in prison and our indifference to it?

C. Real Reform

Perhaps the greatest benefit from acknowledging and discussing the reality of adult male sexual victimization is the benefit that will accrue to rape law. The simple fact is that rape reforms over the last thirty years have not had the effect feminists desired. Efforts at rewriting rape laws have been successful at reducing or eliminating the use of force/responsive resistance requirements, defining rape in terms of the absence vel non of consent, and putting the defendant, rather than the victim, on trial by means of rape shield laws. However, the fact remains that law enforcement officers, prosecutors, jurors, and judges are still measuring each rape allegation against a preexisting “real rape” script. For example, in State in the Interest in M.T.S., New Jersey’s highest court re-read New Jersey’s rape statute as not requiring proof of force beyond the force inherent in penetration itself. That was in 1992. Now, almost twenty years later, there has yet to be a prosecution based on this standard. Law enforcement officers and prosecutors still look for force. Similarly, in states where the resistance requirement has been eliminated and jurors are instructed that a woman need not physically resist, some jurors still...
look for evidence of resistance in determining guilt or innocence. Finally, even with rape shield laws, jurors judge the accuser’s credibility based on looks, including her dress, and measure her against standards of the “ideal” rape victim: white, chaste, and prim.

Part of the reason for the paucity of tangible benefits from rape reform is quite likely attributable to our conceptualization of rape as a gendered crime. Men—and this includes law enforcement officers, prosecutors, jurors, and judges—have been taught that all men are potential rapists. To the extent reforms have been won, they have been won by getting men to think about their wives, sisters, and daughters as potential rape victims. But one consequence of this is that men still do not think of themselves as potential rape victims. Yet this could make all the difference. Put differently, we might make significant progress toward eliminating rape if we had a true “interest convergence” between men and women.

Consider the demand that women offer resistance. How might this expectation change if decision makers knew that men, too, are raped and that many men “freeze” when they are sexually assaulted? In short, how might the resistance expectation change if society realized that men, even “real men,” often fail to resist? Similarly, feminists have long argued the force requirement obscures the many other ways in which women are coerced into unwanted sex. Here, again, alliances would be useful in making this point. Being made aware of the nonphysical coercion that occurs in male prisons might help decision makers better understand the nonphysical coercion that women, and men, face outside of prison.

Of course, this is just one benefit to reconceptualizing rape as a crime with both male and female victims. The other benefit is that it exposes the missteps and wrong turns of the feminist movement. In pushing for the rape law reforms of the 1970s and 1980s that cast rape as a gendered crime, feminists inadvertently entrenched the notion that women are victims, to the exclusion of men. Janet Halley has been particularly critical of feminists for this shortcoming. As she

303. See Anderson, Reviving Resistance, supra note 200.
304. Just as women at times have been held up to an ideal standard of beauty and behavior—during the nineteenth century, white, young, chaste, gender-conforming, and of a particular class—we have understood rape in terms of ideal rape victims and ideal rapists. The likelihood of prosecution and likely outcome have often depended on how closely the actual rape matches our preconceptions of those two ideals. For more about the effect of victim status, see Gary LaFree et al., Jurors’ Responses to Victims’ Behavior and Legal Issues in Sexual Assault Trials, 32 SOC. PROBS. 389 (1985); see also Capers, The Unintentional Rapist, supra note 239.
306. King, Male Assault in the Community, supra note 92.
308. For one description of this coercion, see Dolovich, Strategic Segregation in the Modern Prison, supra note 31, at *11.
309. Janet Halley has been particularly critical of feminists for this shortcoming. As she
inherent in rape laws that treated women as naturally unreliable and thus required corroboration—feminists inadvertently entrenched another type of sexist thinking: the weak female victim, incapable of resisting, and requiring special patriarchal protections. How else to explain the rape shield laws that exist now in almost every state? How else to explain the sexual proclivity character evidence that is often now admissible against accused rapists in sexual assault trials, the complete opposite of the general rule that character evidence is inadmissible in criminal trials? How else to explain the rules prohibiting the identification, by name, of rape victims. These special rules exist in part because feminists have long argued that rape is different because of gender. But rape is not different because of gender. If the goal of feminism is to undo gender, rape reforms have undermined that goal at every turn. Worse still, reformers excluded male victimization to make gendered arguments with the goal of making things better for women. But now it is time, indeed past time, to ask the question: are things really better for women? And how about for men?

puts it, feminism has trapped itself into always positing the subordination of women by men. One consequence is that feminism “can’t see injury to men. . . . It can’t see other interests, other forms of power, other justice projects.” Brenda Cossman et al., Gender Sexuality, and Power: Is Feminist Theory Enough?, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 601, 608 (2003) (exchange between Halley and other feminists). And this, Halley adds, has consequences for thinking about rape:

So much feminist rape discourse insists on women’s object-like status in the rape situation: man fucks woman—subject verb object. Could feminism be contributing to, rather than resisting, the alienation of women from their own agency in narratives and events of sexual violence?

Id. at 610–11.

310. See Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexual License, supra note 203, at 80 (observing that by “the early 1980s, almost every jurisdiction in this country had passed some form of rape shield law”). These rape shield laws ostensibly shield a rape complainant’s sexual history on the ground that her history is irrelevant, absent specified exceptions, to the issue of whether or not a rape has occurred. While this goal is laudable, it has had the effect of reinforcing and privileging a rape script that depends on a chaste victim. By prohibiting any discussion of the victim as a sexual being, rape shield laws in effect recast the victim as nonsexual, the proverbial virgin. Consider the rape shield law that exists in New York. Under New York’s rape shield law, the shield permits evidence that the victim has been convicted of prostitution. N.Y. Crim. Proc. L. § 60.42[2].

311. For example, at the urging of feminists, Congress added Rule 413 to the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1994. Rule 413 provides that “[i]n a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of sexual assault, evidence of the defendant’s commission of another offense or offenses of sexual assault is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter which is relevant.” FED. R. EVID. 413(a). The intent of Rule 413 was to supersede in sex offense cases the restrictive aspects of Rule 404(b) that apply to all other cases. See 140 Cong. Rec. 23, 602–03 (1994) (floor statement of the principal House sponsor, Representative Susan Molinar, concerning the prior crimes evidence rules for sexual assault and child molestation cases).

312. FED. R. EVID. 404.

CONCLUSION

My ambition in writing this Article has been two-fold: first, to bring male sexual victimization out of the margins, the footnotes, and indeed the closet; and second, to demonstrate that including male sexual victimization in how we conceptualize rape can be helpful in thinking about the law of rape. The broader goal, of course, is about nudging norms so that unwanted sex becomes unacceptable, no matter whether the victim is male or female, incarcerated or otherwise. The broader goal, too, is about rethinking how and what we prosecute when it comes to rape. The end goal, of course, is to completely eliminate rape. The first step is to rethink rape and gender and understand that, while rape is often done by men, it is also done to men. And that this, too, is real rape.